Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Mar, 2024, Volume 92, Issue 2

Flexible Moral Hazard Problems

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21383
p. 387-409

George Georgiadis, Doron Ravid, Balázs Szentes

This paper considers a moral hazard problem where the agent can choose any output distribution with a support in a given compact set. The agent's effort‐cost is smooth and increasing in first‐order stochastic dominance. To analyze this model, we develop a generalized notion of the first‐order approach applicable to optimization problems over measures. We demonstrate each output distribution can be implemented and identify those contracts that implement that distribution. These contracts are characterized by a simple first‐order condition for each output that equates the agent's marginal cost of changing the implemented distribution around that output with its marginal benefit. Furthermore, the agent's wage is shown to be increasing in output. Finally, we consider the problem of a profit‐maximizing principal and provide a first‐order characterization of principal‐optimal distributions.


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