Best Paper Awards

Quantitative Economics and Theoretical Economics Best Paper Awards

The Econometric Society adopted a "Best Paper Prize" in 2015 for its two journals Quantitative Economics and Theoretical Economics. These awards highlight the best paper published in each of the journals in the areas of quantitative economics and economic theory. Prior to 2019, the journals' Editors and Co-Editors selected a list of nominees, from which the Associate Editors elected the winning paper.

In 2019, the process was enhanced, awarding the prize biannually by an external committee. The award is now made to a single paper in alternate years for QE and TE. The award will be presented once every two years to a paper published in the journal during the past two years defined as any paper published in any of the two volumes in the two calendar years immediately preceding the year in which the award is made. 

The following papers have been awarded the Best Paper Prize:

2018

Jaromír Kovářík, Friederike Mengel, and José Gabriel Romero, "Learning in Network Games," Quantitative Economics, Volume 9, Issue 1, March 2018, 85-139.  (Selection Committee: Elie Tamer, Chair; Nikhil Agarwal, and Juan F. Rubio-Ramírez).

2017

William Diamond and Nikhil Agarwal, “Latent indices in assortative matching models,” Quantitative Economics, Volume 8, Issue 3, 685–728.

Péter Eső and Balázs Szentes, “Dynamic contracting: An irrelevance theorem,” Theoretical Economics, Volume 12, Issue 1, 109-139.

2016

Brendan Kline and Elie Tamer, "Bayesian inference in a class of partially identified models,” Quantitative Economics, Volume 7, Issue 2, 329-366.

Alexander Wolitzky, "Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade,” Theoretical Economics, Volume 11, Issue 3, 971-1004.

2015

Eric Weese, "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations", Quantitative Economics, Volume 6, Issue 2, 257–307

Dilip Abreu, David G. Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti, "One-sided Uncertainty and Delay in Reputational Bargaining", Theoretical Economics, Volume 10, Issue 3, 719–773