Theoretical Economics

Theoretical Economics Volume 18, Issue 2 (May 2023) is now online https://t.co/LT8bO4sxxp https://t.co/uUGQfLyp2O

We show that a simple dynamic process--studied in biology, physics, and chemistry--is applicable to collective decision-making and opinion formation. The process converges to a mixed Nash equilibrium known as a maximal lottery in social choice. https://t.co/ZCwr366315 https://t.co/UWRMqSrRyD

In a voting model with two alternatives, which interim allocation probabilities can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule? We answer this question. Extensions are provided for symmetric monotone and symmetric unanimous implementation. https://t.co/N2uF4Qtzne https://t.co/CHxR0bqD4c

Statistical decision rules map data to actions induced by statistical inference on the data. We establish that these rules may coincide with simple majority or reverse unanimity for data that are chosen strategically in persuasion environments. https://t.co/Fzc2Dx4vLi https://t.co/VZlLrsQdDs

In contests like rent-seeking or R&D, should the efforts of earlier movers be disclosed? The paper shows that such transparency enhances total effort, maximizing it with full transparency and minimizing it with none. https://t.co/Q7ylg7wlAw https://t.co/tNO8MHxaCo

Can a biased agent increase his rents by hiding feasible options from an unaware principal? This paper identifies circumstances under which the agent can and characterizes the disclosure that maximizes the agent's rent in a delegation setting. https://t.co/v66mMcRa2G https://t.co/V6AdfXOm0R

How to design an effort-maximizing mechanism when agents have both private information and convex effort costs, and the designer has a fixed prize budget? This paper shows that it is optimal to utilize a contest, and characterize the optimal contest. https://t.co/gAvwy4exad https://t.co/PYkp1chcuq

Instability is as likely to be good or bad–but can you use it to your advantage? https://t.co/5m3V8DLCm3 https://t.co/zODovgKZ6a

How to coordinate agents to adopt behaviors or products? The key is to incentivize those who are more popular than their friends, exploiting their social influence on others. The coordination cost is the lowest in a complete core-periphery network. https://t.co/nVdeVf6iOw https://t.co/0TEY3sa9ph

When wages reveal employer-worker match quality, a holdup problem may cause efficient equilibria to break down. Non-contingent wage posting coupled with counteroffers solve this holdup problem, but necessarily distort worker mobility. https://t.co/YmTtjOY7xI https://t.co/QcNS5Hc9Z6