Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Sep, 2022, Volume 90, Issue 5

Rules and Commitment in Communication: An Experimental Analysis

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18585
p. 2283-2318

Guillaume R. Fréchette, Alessandro Lizzeri, Jacopo Perego

We study the role of commitment in communication and its interactions with rules, which determine whether information is verifiable. Our framework nests models of cheap talk, information disclosure, and Bayesian persuasion. It predicts that commitment has opposite effects on information transmission under the two alternative rules. We leverage these contrasting forces to experimentally establish that subjects react to commitment in line with the main qualitative implications of the theory. Quantitatively, not all subjects behave as predicted. We show that a form of commitment blindness leads some senders to overcommunicate when information is verifiable and undercommunicate when it is not. This generates an unpredicted gap in information transmission across the two rules, suggesting a novel role for verifiable information in practice.


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Supplement to "Rules and Commitment in Communication: An Experimental Analysis"

Guillaume R. Fréchette, Alessandro Lizzeri and Jacopo Perego

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Supplement to "Rules and Commitment in Communication: An Experimental Analysis"

Guillaume R. Fréchette, Alessandro Lizzeri and Jacopo Perego

This online appendix contains material not found within the manuscript.