Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Nov, 2006, Volume 74, Issue 6

The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost‐Perfect Monitoring

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00717.x
p. 1499-1544

Johannes Hörner, Wojciech Olszewski

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost‐perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, ‐player games that satisfy the usual full‐dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap‐talk communication between players and no public randomization device.


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