New Papers Posted to Theoretical Economics’ Forthcoming Page

The following papers have been accepted and posted to Theoretical Economics’ forthcoming page and may be viewed here:

Constrained preference elicitation
Yaron Azrieli, Christopher P. Chambers, and Paul J. Healy

Simple bets to elicit private signals
Aurelien Baillon and Yan Xu

Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games
Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck

When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?
Alexey I. Kushnir and Lev V. Lokutsievskiy

Communication with forgetful liars
Philippe Jehiel

Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
Yunan Li

Local agency costs of political centralization
Roger B. Myerson

Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment
Harry Pei


Publication Date: 
Friday, October 2, 2020