New Papers Posted to Theoretical Economics’ Forthcoming Page

The following papers have been accepted and posted to Theoretical Economics’ forthcoming page and may be viewed here:

Matching with floor constraints
Sumeyra Akin

Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov

Approval voting without ballot restrictions
Federica Ceron and Stéphane Gonzalez

Bounds on price setting
Narayana R. Kocherlakota

Cooperative strategic games
Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman

A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement
Simon Loertscher and Claudio Mezzetti

Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions
Carolina Manzano and Xavier Vives

Revenue from matching platforms
Philip Marx and James Schummer

Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries and competing paths of diffusion in networks
Mihai Manea

Publication Date: 
Tuesday, November 24, 2020