New Papers Posted to Theoretical Economics’ Forthcoming Page

The following papers have been accepted and posted to Theoretical Economics’ forthcoming page and may be viewed here:


Monitoring experts

Yaron Azrieli


Subgame-perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: dispensing with public randomization

Paulo Barelli and John Duggan


The implications of finite-order reasoning

Adam Brandenburger, Alexander Danieli, and Amanda Friedenberg


Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance

Battal Dogan and Lars Ehlers


Bayesian privacy

Ran Eilat, Kfir Eliaz, and Xiaosheng Mu


Optimal organ allocation policy under blood-type barriers with the donor-priority rule

Jaehong Kim and Mengling Li


Robust group strategy-proofness

Steven Kivinen and Norovsambuu Tumennasan


Relational communication

Anton Kolotilin and Hongyi Li


Renegotiation of long-term contracts as part of an implicit agreement

Rumen Kostadinov


Local global equivalence in voting models: a characterization and applications

Ujjwal Kumar, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav, and Huaxia Zeng


Robust sequential search

Karl H. Schlag and Andriy Zapechelnyuk


Publication Date: 
Wednesday, February 3, 2021