Econometrica: Jan 1982, Volume 50, Issue 1

Voting with Proportional Veto Power

https://doi.org/0012-9682(198201)50:1<145:VWPVP>2.0.CO;2-B
p. 145-162

H. Moulin

We give necessary conditions for a neutral social choice function to be partially implementable by means of a strong equilibrium (i.e., implementable by cooperative agents): the veto power of the various coalitions should be maximally distributed. If moreover the social choice function is veto-anonymous, then the veto power of a coalition must be (roughly) proportional to its size: x per cent of the agents have the power to veto x per cent of the candidates. The procedure of "voting by successive veto" is an example of a neutral and (nearly) veto-anonymous social choice function which is implementable.
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