Quantitative Economics
Journal Of The Econometric Society
Edited by: Stéphane Bonhomme • Print ISSN: 1759-7323 • Online ISSN: 1759-7331
Edited by: Stéphane Bonhomme • Print ISSN: 1759-7323 • Online ISSN: 1759-7331
Quantitative Economics: Nov, 2016, Volume 7, Issue 3
Andres Aradillas‐López, Amit Gandhi
We study the estimation of static games where players are allowed to have ordered actions, such as the number of stores to enter into a market. Assuming that payoff functions satisfy general shape restrictions, we show that equilibrium of the game implies a covariance restriction between each player's action and a component of the player's payoff function that we call the strategic index. The strategic index captures the direction of strategic interaction (i.e., patterns of substitutability or complementarity) as well as the relative effects of opponents' decisions on players' payoffs. The covariance restriction we derive is robust to the presence of multiple equilibria, and provides a basis for identification and estimation of the strategic index. We introduce an econometric method for inference in our model that exploits the information in moment inequalities in a computationally simple way. We analyze its properties through Monte Carlo experiments and then apply our approach to study entry behavior by chain stores where there is both an intensive margin of entry (how many stores to open in a market) as well as the usual extensive margin of entry (whether to enter a market or not). Using data from retail pharmacies we find evidence of asymmetries in strategic effects among firms in the industry that has implications for merger policy. We also find that business stealing effects are less pronounced in larger markets, which helps explain the large positive correlation in entry behavior observed in the data.
Static games multiple equilibria partial identification conditional moment inequalities entry decisions C01 C14 C57
March 5, 2024
The terms of the Editors of the Econometric Society's three journals end June 30, 2025. We are pleased to announce the incoming Editors and to thank the outgoing Editors for their excellent and continuing service.
Econometrica: Since 2019, Guido Imbens has served as the 14th Editor of Econometrica. On July 1, 2025, Marina Halac will become the Editor.
Quantitative Economics: Stéphane Bonhomme has been the Editor of Quantitative Economics since 2021. His successor will be Bernard Salanié.
Theoretical Economics: The Editor of Theoretical Economics since 2021 has been Simon Board. Taking over for him in July 2025 will be Federico Echenique.
Guido, Stéphane, and Simon have been outstanding Editors. We are grateful to them for the work they have done and will continue to do, and we look forward to further congratulating them next year. We believe Marina, Bernard, and Federico will be outstanding successors and we thank them in advance for their service.
Finally, we are grateful to Larry Samuelson for chairing all three search committees, and we thank the search committee members for their hard and fruitful work:
Econometrica: Christian Dustmann, Lars Hansen, Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, Ariel Pakes, Helene Rey, and Elie Tamer.
QE: Kate Ho, Michael Keane, Felix Kubler, Whitney Newey, and Frank Schorfheide.
TE: Jeff Ely, Johannes Horner, Gilat Levy, Meg Meyer, and Ran Spiegler.