Econometrica
Forthcoming Articles

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues of Econometrica. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.


Algorithms for Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring

Abreu, Dilip, Benjamin Brooks, and Yuliy Sannikov

Tackling Youth Unemployment: Evidence from a Labor Market Experiment in Uganda

Alfonsi, Livia, Oriana Bandiera, Vittorio Bassi, Robin Burgess, Imran Rasul, Munshi Sulaiman, and Anna Vitali

Cheap Talk with Endogenous Conflict of Interest

Antić, Nemanja, and Nicola Persico

Corrigendum to "Trading and Information Diffusion in Over-the-Counter Markets"

Babus, Ana, Péter Kondor, and Yilin Wang

State Capacity, Reciprocity and the Social Contract

Besley, Timothy J.

Reply: State Capacity, Reciprocity, and the Social Contract

Besley, Timothy J.

A Comment on: State Capacity, Reciprocity, and the Social Contract by Timothy Besley

Bisin, Alberto

Realized Semicovariances

Bollerslev, Tim, Jia Li, Andrew J. Patton, and Rogier Quaedvlieg

Civic Culture, State Capacities and War: A Comment

Bowles, Samuel

Bootstrap-Based Inference for Cube Root Asymptotics

Cattaneo, Matias D., Michael Jansson, and Kenichi Nagasawa

Micro to Macro: Optimal Trade Policy with Firm Heterogeneity

Costinot, Arnaud, Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, and Iván Werning

Dynamic Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Insider Information

Detemple, Jerome, Marcel Rindisbacher, and Scott Robertson

Rational Bubbles in UK Housing Markets: Comment

Domeij, David, and Tore Ellingsen

Sequential Information Design

Doval, Laura, and Jeffrey C. Ely

Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms

Dworczak, Piotr

Social Media and Protest Participation: Evidence from Russia

Enikolopov, Ruben, Alexey Makarin, and Maria Petrova

Reputation and the Flow of Information in Repeated Games

Faingold, Eduardo

Optimal Transport Networks in Spatial Equilibrium

Fajgelbaum, Pablo D., and Edouard Schaal

Misinterpreting Others and the Fragility of Social Learning

Frick, Mira, Ryota Iijima, and Yuhta Ishii

Targeting Interventions in Networks

Galeotti, Andrea, Benjamin Golub, and Sanjeev Goyal

Optimal Monitoring Design

Georgiadis, George and Balazs Szentes

Classic Rational Bubbles in U.K. Housing Markets: Reply

Giglio, Stefano, Matteo Maggiori, and Johannes Stroebel

Paralyzed by Fear: Rigid and Discrete Pricing under Demand Uncertainty

Ilut, Cosmin, Rosen Valchev, and Nicolas Vincent

Revision Games

Kamada, Yuichiro, and Michihiro Kandori

Leave-out estimation of variance components

Kline, Patrick, Raffaele Saggio, and Mikkel Sølvsten

Labor Share Decline and Intellectual Property Products Capital

Koh, Dongya, Raül Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Yu Zheng

Cheap Talk with Transparent Motives

Lipnowski, Elliot, and Doron Ravid

Diverging Tests of Equal Predictive Ability

McCracken, Michael W.

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design

MIrrokni, Vahab, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang, and Song Zuo

Segmentary Lineage Organization and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

Moscona, Jacob, Nathan Nunn, and James A. Robinson

Comment on State Capacity, Reciprocity, and the Social Contract by Timothy J. Besley

Papaioannou, Elias

Reputation Effects under Interdependent Values

Pei, Harry

Matching with Complementary Contracts

Rostek, Marzena, and Nathan Yoder

Statistical Inference in Games

Salant, Yuval, and Josh Cherry

A Structural Econometric Analysis of Network Formation

Sheng, Shuyang