Forthcoming Articles

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues of Econometrica. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

Algorithms for Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring

Abreu, Dilip, Benjamin Brooks, and Yuliy Sannikov

Understanding HANK: Insights from a PRANK

Acharya, Sushant, and Keshav Dogra

Corrigendum to "Trading and Information Diffusion in Over-the-Counter Markets"

Babus, Ana, Péter Kondor, and Yilin Wang

State Capacity, Reciprocity and the Social Contract

Besley, Timothy J.

Reply: State Capacity, Reciprocity, and the Social Contract

Besley, Timothy J.

A Comment on: State Capacity, Reciprocity, and the Social Contract by Timothy Besley

Bisin, Alberto

Realized Semicovariances

Bollerslev, Tim, Jia Li, Andrew J. Patton, and Rogier Quaedvlieg

Civic Culture, State Capacities and War: A Comment

Bowles, Samuel

Tradability and the Labor-Market Impact of Immigration: Theory and Evidence from the U.S.

Burstein, Ariel, Gordon Hanson, Lin Tian, and Jonathan Vogel

Unbundling Polarization

Canen, Nathan, Chad Kendall, and Francesco Trebbi

Age of Marriage, Weather Shocks, and the Direction of Marriage Payments

Corno, Lucia, Nicole Hildebrandt and Alessandra Voena

Inferring Cognitive Heterogeneity from Aggregate Choices

Dardanoni, Valentino,Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti, and Christopher J. Tyson

The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Anonymous Random Matching

Deb, Joyee, Takuo Sugaya, and Alexander Wolitzky

Rational Bubbles in UK Housing Markets: Comment

Domeij, David, and Tore Ellingsen

Social Media and Protest Participation: Evidence from Russia

Enikolopov, Ruben, Alexey Makarin, and Maria Petrova

Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Liver Exchange

Ergin, Haluk, Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver

Reputation and the Flow of Information in Repeated Games

Faingold, Eduardo

Optimal Transport Networks in Spatial Equilibrium

Fajgelbaum, Pablo D., and Edouard Schaal

Classic Rational Bubbles in U.K. Housing Markets: Reply

Giglio, Stefano, Matteo Maggiori, and Johannes Stroebel

Selection Without Exclusion

Honoré, Bo E., and Luojia Hu

Revision Games

Kamada, Yuichiro, and Michihiro Kandori

Randomization and Ambiguity Aversion

Ke, Shaowei, and Qi Zhang

Cheap Talk with Transparent Motives

Lipnowski, Elliot, and Doron Ravid

Segmentary Lineage Organization and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

Moscona, Jacob, Nathan Nunn, and James A. Robinson

Social Learning Equilibria

Mossel, Elchanan, Manuel Mueller-Frank, Allan Sly and Omer Tamuz

Comment on State Capacity, Reciprocity, and the Social Contract by Timothy J. Besley

Papaioannou, Elias

Matching with Complementary Contracts

Rostek, Marzena, and Nathan Yoder

Statistical Inference in Games

Salant, Yuval, and Josh Cherry