Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Supplemental Material

Econometrica - Volume 75, Issue 6

Supplementary material for: "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?"

This Web Appendix provides background and more detail for the paper. It has five sections, the last of which, containing figures, is in a separate pdf file:A. Interaction between value adjustment and the bidding trade-off in first-price auctions.B. Calculation of First- and Second-Price Equilibrium, Cursed Equilibrium, and Level-k Bidding Strategies for Kagel and Levin's (1986), Avery and Kagel's (1997) and Goeree, Holt and Palfrey's (2002) Experimental Designs.C. Estimates for Level-k plus Equilibrium Models with versus without Truthful Types.D. Estimates of Subject-specific Precisions and Standard Errors (starts at A-29).E. Logit Bid Densities for Random L1, Random L2, Truthful L1, Truthful L2, and Equilibrium and Representative Precisions.(For section E see: "Supplementary material for "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?": Graphs").

Supplementary material for "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?": Data and Programs

This zip file provides the initial-response data from the four treatments analyzed in the paper, as well as instructions and Matlab files for replicating the econometric analysis. See ReplicabilityReadMe file for detailed description.

Supplementary material for "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?": Graphs

This file contains Section E of the Web Appendix, which graphs the logit bid densities for Random L1, Random L2, Truthful L1, Truthful L2, and Equilibrium and Representative Precisions, to illustrate the implications of the precision estimates reported in Tables IIIa-IIId and Section D of the Web Appendix.

Testing for Regime Switching, Supplementary material

This file contains the program code that generates the approximated tail lower bound distribution of the QLR tet statistic given in the papger, for the four different cases considered in Table 1 and obtained by Theorem 7.

Testing for Regime Switching, Supplementary material

The program code that generates the approximated tail lower bound distribution of the QLR tet statistic given in the papger.

Testing for Regime Switching, Supplementary material

This file contains an explanation for the two software supplementary files.

Supplementary material for "A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default"

This zip file contains programs and data accompanying the paper "A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with RIsk of Default", and a readme.txt file that describes them.

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