We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate; all acceptable mates are welfare‐wise identical.
MLA
Bogomolnaia, Anna, and Herve Moulin. “Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences.” Econometrica, vol. 72, .no 1, Econometric Society, 2004, pp. 257-279, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00483.x
Chicago
Bogomolnaia, Anna, and Herve Moulin. “Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences.” Econometrica, 72, .no 1, (Econometric Society: 2004), 257-279. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00483.x
APA
Bogomolnaia, A., & Moulin, H. (2004). Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences. Econometrica, 72(1), 257-279. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00483.x
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