Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: May, 2007, Volume 75, Issue 3

On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap Talk: A Comment

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00771.x
p. 885-893

Gilat Levy, Ronny Razin

We analyze a cheap talk game, à la Crawford and Sobel, in a multidimensional state and policy space. A feature of the multidimensional state space is that communication on one dimension often reveals information on others. We show how this feature imposes bounds on communication.


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Supplemental Material

On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap Talk: Supplementary Material

In this Appendix we extend our results of the paper to a general family of single-peaked preferences (similar to those of Crawford and Sobel (1982), but adopted to the multidimensional state space). We show that when the conflict between the sender and the receiver is large, these preferences have similar characteristics to those of the lexicographic preferences analysed in the paper. We prove that communication is restricted in this environment as well.

On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap Talk: Supplementary Material

In this Appendix we extend our results of the paper to a general family of single-peaked preferences (similar to those of Crawford and Sobel (1982), but adopted to the multidimensional state space). We show that when the conflict between the sender and the receiver is large, these preferences have similar characteristics to those of the lexicographic preferences analysed in the paper. We prove that communication is restricted in this environment as well.