Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Nov, 2004, Volume 72, Issue 6

Large Robust Games

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00549.x
p. 1631-1665

Ehud Kalai

With many semi‐anonymous players, the equilibria of simultaneous‐move games are . This means that the equilibria survive even if the simultaneous‐play assumption is relaxed to allow for a large variety of extensive modifications. Such modifications include sequential play with partial and differential revelation of information, commitments, multiple revisions of choices, cheap talk announcements, and more.


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