Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Jan, 2022, Volume 90, Issue 1

Robust Screens for Noncompetitive Bidding in Procurement Auctions

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA17155
p. 315-346

Sylvain Chassang, Kei Kawai, Jun Nakabayashi, Juan Ortner

We document a novel bidding pattern observed in procurement auctions from Japan: winning bids tend to be isolated, and there is a missing mass of close losing bids. This pattern is suspicious in the following sense: its extreme forms are inconsistent with competitive behavior under arbitrary information structures. Building on this observation, we develop systematic tests of competitive behavior in procurement auctions that allow for general information structures as well as nonstationary unobserved heterogeneity. We provide an empirical exploration of our tests, and show they can help identify other suspicious patterns in the data.


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Supplemental Material

Supplement to "Robust Screens for Noncompetitive Bidding in Procurement Auctions"

Chassang, Sylvain, Kei Kawai, Jun Nakabayashi, and Juan Ortner

This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.

Supplement to "Robust Screens for Noncompetitive Bidding in Procurement Auctions"

Chassang, Sylvain, Kei Kawai, Jun Nakabayashi, and Juan Ortner

This online appendix contains material not found within the manuscript.