Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Jul, 2001, Volume 69, Issue 4

Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
p. 1013-1037

Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew O. Jackson, Michel Le Breton

We study the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. We show that the outcomes of nondictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity will be affected by the incentives of noncontending candidates (i.e., who cannot win the election) to influence the outcome by entering or exiting the election.

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