Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Jan, 2001, Volume 69, Issue 1

A Folk Theorem for Asynchronously Repeated Games
p. 191-200

Kiho Yoon

We prove a Folk Theorem for asynchronously repeated games in which the set of players who can move in period , denoted by , is a random variable whose distribution is a function of the past action choices of the players and the past realizations of 's, τ=1, 2,…,−1. We impose a condition, the finite periods of inaction (FPI) condition, which requires that the number of periods in which every player has at least one opportunity to move is bounded. Given the FPI condition together with the standard nonequivalent utilities (NEU) condition, we show that every feasible and strictly individually rational payoff vector can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of an asynchronously repeated game.

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