Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Sep, 1984, Volume 52, Issue 5

Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility

https://doi.org/0012-9682(198409)52:5<1117:BEWCCA>2.0.CO;2-P
p. 1117-1128

Michael Peters

This paper considers price competition among firms when there are capacity constraints and buyers have limited ability to visit firms. A natural method of allocating buyers among firms arises in the equilibrium of the buyers' search game. Sufficient conditions are given under which the buyers' equilibrium varies continuously with the prices charged by firms. Capacity constraints are used to guarantee that this ensures existence of (mixed strategy) equilibria for the pricing game played by sellers. We show that natural pure strategy equilibria arise when the game is made large in appropriate ways.


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