Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Mar, 1971, Volume 39, Issue 2

The Theory of Representative Majority Decision<273:TTORMD>2.0.CO;2-W
p. 273-284

Peter C. Fishburn

A general definition of majority decision in terms of a hierarchy of voting councils has been given by Murakami [3, 4]. The present article establishes a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for Murakami's majority decision or representative system in terms of properties of a group decision function for two alternatives. One corollary of the general theorem is Murakami's conjecture, which says that if a group decision function is dual, strongly monotonic, and nondictatorial, then it is a representative system.

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