Econometrica: Nov 2017, Volume 85, Issue 6

Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture

DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13333
p. 1763-1791

Nathan H. Miller, Matthew C. Weinberg

We document abrupt increases in retail beer prices just after the consummation of the MillerCoors joint venture, both for MillerCoors and its major competitor, Anheuser‐Busch. Within the context of a differentiated‐products pricing model, we test and reject the hypothesis that the price increases can be explained by movement from one Nash–Bertrand equilibrium to another. Counterfactual simulations imply that prices after the joint venture are 6%–8% higher than they would have been with Nash–Bertrand competition, and that markups are 17%–18% higher. We relate the results to documentary evidence that the joint venture may have facilitated price coordination.

Log In To View Full Content

Supplemental Material

Supplement to "Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture"

This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.

Read More View ZIP


Supplement to "Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture"

This online supplement contains material not found within the manuscript.

Read More View PDF


Back