Econometrica: May 2014, Volume 82, Issue 3

Stochastic Choice and Consideration Sets

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10575
p. 1153-1176

Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti

We model a boundedly rational agent who suffers from limited attention. The agent considers each feasible alternative with a given (unobservable) probability, the , and then chooses the alternative that maximizes a preference relation within the set of considered alternatives. We show that this random choice rule is the only one for which the impact of removing an alternative on the choice probability of any other alternative is asymmetric and menu independent. Both the preference relation and the attention parameters are identified uniquely by stochastic choice data.

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Supplemental Material

Supplement to "Stochastic Choice and Consideration Sets"

This file contains supplemental appendices C and D.

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