Econometrica: Mar 2014, Volume 82, Issue 2

Stable Matching With Incomplete Information

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11183
p. 541-587

Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one‐sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make. We show that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty in incomplete‐information environments, and is a superset of the set of complete‐information stable outcomes. We then provide sufficient conditions for incomplete‐information stable matchings to be efficient. Lastly, we define a notion of price‐sustainable allocations and show that the set of incomplete‐information stable matchings is a subset of the set of such allocations.

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