Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262
Econometrica: Sep, 2010, Volume 78, Issue 5
https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA8882
p. 1749-1772
Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim, Dov Monderer
Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite‐valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains.
PDF providing additional proofs for the manuscript.
November 22, 2022
