Econometrica: Nov 1990, Volume 58, Issue 6

Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities<1255:RLAEIG>2.0.CO;2-S
p. 1255-1277

John Roberts, Paul Milgrom

We study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition, macroeconomic coordination failures, arms races, bank runs, technology adoption and diffusion, R&D competition, pretrial bargaining, coordination in teams, and many others. For all these games, the sets of pure strategy Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds. Also, for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best-response dynamics and Bayesian learning, the players' choices lie eventually within the same bounds. These bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters.

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