Empirical Strategies in Economics: 
Illuminating the Path from Cause to Effect

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Abstract

The view that empirical strategies in economics should be transparent and credible now goes almost without saying. The local average treatment effects (LATE) framework for causal inference helped make this so. The LATE theorem tells us for whom particular instrumental variables (IV) estimates are valid. This lecture uses empirical examples, mostly involving effects of charter and exam school attendance, to highlight the value of the LATE framework. A surprising exclusion restriction is shown to explain why enrollment at Chicago exam schools reduces student achievement. I also make two broader points: IV exclusion restrictions formalize commitment to clear and consistent explanations of reduced-form causal effects; compelling applications demonstrate the power of simple empirical strategies to generate new causal knowledge.

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To measure the effect of good or bad water supply, it is requisite to find two
classes of inhabitants living at the same level, moving in equal space, enjoying
an equal share of the means of subsistence, engaged in the same pursuits, but
differing in this respect—that one drinks water from Battersea, the other from
Kew ... But of such experimenta crucis the circumstances of London do not
admit.
– William Farr (1853, Weekly Return of Births and Deaths in London)

The experiment ... was on the grandest scale. No fewer than 300,000 people
of both sexes, of every age and occupation, and of every rank and station, from
gentle-folks down to the very poor, were divided into two groups without their
choice, and, in some cases, without their knowledge; one group being supplied
with water containing the sewage of London, and, amongst it, whatever might
have come from the cholera patients, the other group having water free from such
impurity.
– John Snow (1855, On the Mode of Communication of Cholera, 2nd ed.)

1 Introduction

In a chapter in the Handbook of Labor Economics, Alan Krueger and I employed the phrase
“empirical strategy” to describe econometric analysis of natural experiments like the one
John Snow (1855) used to show that cholera is a waterborne illness. The Handbook volume
in question (Ashenfelter and Card, 1999) was edited by two of my Princeton Ph.D. thesis
advisors, Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, leaders in the battle to bring empirical strategies
like Snow’s into the econometric mainstream. Ashenfelter and Card’s quest for an empirical
strategy to capture the causal effects of government training programs inspired me and others
at Princeton to explore the econometrics of program evaluation.¹

An empirical strategy for program or policy evaluation is a research plan that encompasses
data collection, identification, and estimation. As Krueger and I used it, the term identification
is shorthand for research design. The prize I share with David Card and Guido Imbens
recognizes the prominent role research design has come to play in modern economics. A
randomized clinical trial (RCT) is the simplest and most powerful research design. Random
assignment ensures that treatment and control groups are comparable in the absence
of treatment, so post-treatment differences in average outcomes reflect only the treatment
effect. Not surprisingly, though also not without resistance, RCTs have come to be both an
aspiration and a benchmark for empirical strategies in economics.²

¹Their quest began in Ashenfelter (1974, 1978) and Ashenfelter and Card (1985). A few years ahead of
me, Ashenfelter student Robert J. LaLonde had shown how difficult the search was likely to be (LaLonde,
1986). Orley Ashenfelter not only brought me to Princeton and arranged to fund my studies (dayenu!), he
suggested my thesis topic. Ashenfelter kicked off a Graduate Labor Economics class in 1986 by mentioning
an intriguing study: Hearst et al. (1986) compares the death rates of men with low and high draft lottery
numbers as a gauge of the long-term health consequences of conscription. “Someone should do that for their
earnings,” quoth Orley. I went from class to the library, embarking on my first attempt to answer causal
questions using observational data. Farr and Snow in the epigraph are quoted in Johnson (2006).

²The 2019 Economics Nobel awarded to Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Michael Kremer celebrates
Krueger (1999)’s class size study illustrates the power of RCTs to generate clear findings, and to set standards by which non-randomized investigations are measured. The effects of reduced grade-school class size have long preoccupied economists interested in the education production function. For decades, Hanushek (1986, 1996) and others had argued that expenditure on education inputs, like smaller classes, is largely uncorrelated with higher achievement. Krueger’s analysis of the Tennessee STAR class size RCT (which addressed econometric problems related to attrition, clustering, and noncompliance) showed strong, robust causal effects of class size reductions on learning. These findings have been integral to the school resources debate ever since. At the same time, RCTs at the scale of Tennessee STAR remain costly and time-consuming. Such ambitious social experiments are still unusual.

I see instrumental variables (IV) methods and regression discontinuity (RD) designs as the next best thing to an RCT when practical considerations inhibit use of experimental random assignment. In applications of IV and RD, causal variables of interest (like class size) are often referred to as treatment variables. This terminology evokes an analogy with RCTs that randomize treatment assignment. Like RCTs, compelling IV and RD strategies exploit an econometrician’s understanding of the mechanisms that determine treatment assignment. It’s this understanding that give IV and RD their causality-revealing power.

The simplest IV applications are RCTs in which subjects randomly assigned to treatment deviate from the treatment protocol (Krueger (1999) is a version of this). RD applications exploit rules, regulations, and the need to classify people for assignment purposes according to whether a classification variable (today called a running variable) clears a cutoff. But RD does not require the treatment variable whose causes we seek to switch fully on or off at the cutoff; fruitful RD requires only that the conditional mean of this variable jump at the cutoff. Allowing for this leads to the use of discontinuities in the rate at which treatment is assigned to construct IV estimates of the effect of treatment received. This sort of RD design is said to be fuzzy. But, as Steve Pischke and I wrote in our first book (Angrist and Pischke (2009)), “fuzzy RD is IV.”

The first RD application to which I contributed is Angrist and Lavy (1999), which exploits the rule used in Israeli elementary schools to determine class size. In the 1990s, Israeli classes were large. Students enrolling with 40 students in the same grade were likely to be seated in a class of 40. But add another child to the cohort, making 41, and the cohort was likely to be split into two much smaller classes. This leads to the Maimonides’ Rule research design, so named because the 12th Century philosopher and Torah scholar Maimonides proposed a maximum class size of 40.

Figure 1 plots Israeli fourth grade class sizes as a function of contemporaneous fourth grade enrollment, overlaid with the class size prescribed by Maimonides Rule. The fit isn’t

3RD originated in work by psychologists Donald Campbell and D.L. Thistlethwaite (Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960). Econometric RD pioneers Goldberger (1972) and Barnow (1972) discuss hypothetical applications of RD to evaluation of the nascent Head Start program. Cook (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010) sketch the intellectual history of RD.

4The Rule is from Chapter II of “Laws Concerning the Study of Torah” in Book I of Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah. Maimonides’ proposal is founded on the Talmud, though the great sage appears to have taken liberties in favoring a cutoff of 40 over 50. The Talmud limits class size as follows: “The number of pupils assigned to each teacher is twenty-five. If there are fifty, we appoint two teachers. If there are forty, we appoint an assistant, at the expense of the town” (English translation on page 214 of Epstein (1976)).
perfect—it’s this feature that makes our use of Maimonides’ Rule a fuzzy RD design and necessitates use of IV. But the gist of the thing is a marked drop in average class size at integer multiples of 40 (the relevant cutoffs), as predicted by the Rule. As it turns out, these drops in class size are reflected in jumps in fourth (and fifth) grade test scores.\(^5\)

Lavy and I implemented the Maimonides’ Rule IV research design in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) set-up that can be described as follows. Writing \(f_j\) for the predicted 4th grade class size at school \(j\), Rule-based enrollment is:

\[
f_j = \frac{r_j}{\left[\text{int}\left(\frac{(r_j - 1)}{40}\right) + 1\right]},
\]

(1)

where \(r_j\) is the number of 4th graders at school \(j\) and \(\text{int}(x)\) is the largest integer less than or equal to \(x\). The first-stage effect of instrumental variable \(f_j\) on class size is estimated by fitting:

\[
s_{ij} = \pi f_j + h_1(r_j) + \delta'_1 X_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij},
\]

(2)

where \(s_{ij}\) is the class size experienced by student \(i\) enrolled in school \(j\), \(X_{ij}\) is a vector of student and school characteristics, \(f_j\) and \(r_j\) are as defined above, and \(\varepsilon_{ij}\) is a regression error term. Second-stage models can be written:

\[
y_{ij} = \beta s_{ij} + h_2(r_j) + \delta'_2 X_{ij} + \eta_{ij},
\]

(3)

where \(\beta\) is the causal effect of interest and \(\eta_{ij}\) is the random part of potential achievement. Both first and second stage control for polynomial functions of the running variable, denoted \(h_1(r_j)\) in the first stage and \(h_2(r_j)\) in the second. This IV model is identified because \(f_j\) is not only a nonlinear function of enrollment, it’s discontinuous.

Angrist and Lavy (1999) uses the local average treatment effects (LATE) framework to interpret estimates based on (2) and (3) in a world of heterogeneous potential outcomes. Specifically, we showed that Rule-based IV estimates capture average causal effects for students pushed into smaller classes by Maimonides’ Rule, for students attending classes that would be seen as unusually large by US standards. Yet, when converted to standard deviation units, the Maimonides’ Rule effect sizes are remarkably close to those reported by Krueger (1999). Following a suggestion from Caroline Hoxby, we also undertook an analysis of applicants in “discontinuity samples” limited to applicants close to Maimonides’ Rule cutoffs.\(^6\) Shortly thereafter, Hahn et al. (2001) formalized the LATE interpretation of nonparametric fuzzy RD. Applications of this new approach to IV and RD, initially isolated, bloom widely today.

This lecture uses examples to illustrate the power of IV and RD empirical strategies to uncover new causal knowledge. Most of these examples concern causal effects of attendance

\(^5\)Or so they were in 1991 data. Revisiting the Maimonides’ Rule research design with Israeli data for 2002-11, Angrist et al. (2019a) estimates class size effects tightly distributed around zero. Many countries have their own version of Maimonides’ Rule, usually with cutoffs below 40. For example, Angrist et al. (2017a) uses Italy’s version to estimate causal effects of class size on the manipulation of standardized test scores. Sims (2008) uses Maimonides’ Rule to document unintended consequences of a California class size reduction program that encouraged the use of classes mixing elementary school grades.

\(^6\)In closely related work, Hoxby (2000) used variation in the size of school-age populations in Connecticut school districts to construct instruments for class size.
at schools of various kinds. The question of school effects highlights key features of the LATE framework, including an extension to causal effects on distributions. This extension shows how urban charter school attendance closes Black-White achievement gaps. Exclusions restrictions are typically the most controversial part of any IV story. My last example proposes and tests a surprising exclusion restriction: diversion from high-performing urban charter schools explains why enrollment at Chicago’s selective enrollment high schools reduces student achievement. The lecture concludes with a few comments on the evolution of empirical economics since the 1980s.

2 Exam Time!

Suppose you’d like to run an RCT in which half of subjects are treated. You might randomly assign treatment by using your computer to draw a standard uniformly distributed random variable for each subject and treating those drawing values above one-half. This is the RCT version of RD: the running variable is uniformly distributed and the cutoff is one-half. Unlike the typical RD running variable, however, the RCT running variable is, by design, independent of subject characteristics and potential outcomes.

Do comparisons above and below cutoffs—like the comparison of schools with 40 and 41 fourth graders behind—really amount to something similar? Yes! Such comparisons exploit a feature of the physical world: provided the running variable has a continuous distribution, assignment rates approach the coin-toss rate of one-half when computed in a narrow (symmetric) window around the cutoff used to adjudicate treatment. In RD empirical work, the window around a cutoff is known as a bandwidth. Importantly, in the absence of any running variable manipulation that might interfere with continuity, the limiting probability of treatment as bandwidth shrinks is 0.5 for everybody, regardless of subject characteristics or potential outcomes.

This remarkable fact can be seen in data on applicants to one of New York’s highly coveted screened schools. By way of background, roughly 40% of New York City’s middle and high schools select their applicants on the basis of test scores, grades, and other exacting criteria. Only those applicants ranked sufficiently high are offered a screened-school seat. For screened-school applicants, running variables are the ranks schools assign their applicants. The cutoffs for screened schools typically fall towards the top of the applicant distribution, rather than in the middle as for our hypothetical RCT.

Figure 2 documents the near random assignment of seats for a subset of applicants to New York’s storied Townsend Harris high school. U.S. News and World Report recently ranked highly-selective Townsend Harris 12th nationwide, though New York has other even more selective schools. Bar height in the figure marks the qualification rate, that is, the likelihood of earning a Townsend Harris admissions score above that of the lowest-scoring applicant offered a seat. In our research on school assignment, my collaborators and I refer to qualification rather than admission because, in a centralized match such as that used by New York City high schools, qualification at Townsend Harris is necessary but not sufficient

7More precisely, this share refers to school programs—New York’s school buildings may host more than one program.
to be seated there. The first pair of bars in Figure 2 show qualification rates conditional on a measure of pre-application “baseline” achievement. In particular, the bars mark qualification rates conditional on whether an applicant has upper-quartile or lower-quartile 6th grade scores.

Student achievement is highly persistent over time. Not surprisingly, therefore, Townsend Harris applicants with high baseline scores are much more likely to qualify there than are applicants with low baseline scores. In a shrinking symmetric bandwidth around the school’s cutoff, however, qualification rates in the two groups converge. The bar pair second from left shows conditional qualification rates in a window estimated as suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), the “IK bandwidth.” Moving to the right, we see conditional qualification in a window of width .75 IK and then .5 IK. In the latter, the original sample size of about 2200 has fallen to around 500. Conditional qualification rates computed in the narrowest window are both remarkably close to one-half. This is what we’d expect to see were Townsend Harris to admit students by a coin toss rather than on the basis of test scores and grades. Yet, even when admissions operates by the latter rule, the data can be arranged so as to mimic the former.

The Elite Illusion

One of the most controversial questions I’ve studied is that of access to public exam schools like the Boston Latin School (America’s first high school), Chicago’s Payton and Northside selective enrollment high schools, and New York’s legendary Brooklyn Tech, Bronx Science, and Stuyvesant specialized high schools, which have graduated 14 Nobel laureates between them. Exam school proponents see these schools as democratizing public education. Wealthy families, they argue, can access exam-school curricula in the private sector. Shouldn’t bright low-income students be afforded the same chance? Critics of selective enrollment schools argue that, rather than expanding equity, exam schools are inherently biased against the Black and Hispanic students that make up the bulk of America’s urban students. New York’s unimaginably selective Stuyvesant, for example, admitted only 7 Black students to 9th grade in 2019, out of an incoming class of 895.

Motivated by the enduring controversy over selective admissions, my Blueprint Labs

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8 Abdulkadiro˘glu et al. (2017a, 2022) derive the distribution of school assignments generated by the NYC high school match.

9 The figure illustrates the following theorem. Suppose applicant \( i \) qualifies when running variable \( R_i \) clears a fixed cutoff, \( \tau \), and assume the distribution of \( R_i \) is continuously differentiable. Let \( Q_i = 1[R_i > \tau] \) indicate qualification and let \( W_i \) be a random variable (like baseline scores) unchanged by qualification. Then,

\[
\lim_{\delta \to 0} E[Q_i | W_i = w, R_i \in (\tau - \delta, \tau + \delta)] = 0.5.
\]

Lee (2008) articulates the local randomization idea but implements parametric RD. As far as I know, Cattaneo et al. (2015) is the first empirical application based on local randomization, using this for both estimation and inference. Frolich and Huber (2019) and Cattaneo et al. (2017) also discuss the local randomization idea. Non-parametric RD using a shrinking data-driven bandwidth can be justified by smoothness of conditional mean functions for potential outcomes rather than continuity of the running variable distribution, a distinction explored by Dong (2018) and Arai et al. (2022). Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) conditions on lagged outcomes to turn RD tie-breaking assignment into global random assignment.

10 Townsend Harris has graduated three Nobel-laureates, including economist Kenneth Arrow.
collaborators and I have examined the causal effects of exam school attendance in Boston, Chicago, and New York.\textsuperscript{11} This work has generated surprising findings, with profound implications for school assignment policy. Our first exam-school study, which looks at schools in Boston and New York, encapsulates these findings in the title, “The Elite Illusion” (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2014). This alludes to the fact that, while exam school students undoubtedly have high test scores and other good outcomes, this success is not a consequence of exam school attendance. Our estimates consistently suggest that causal effects of exam school attendance on outcomes related to achievement and college attendance are zero, maybe even negative. The strong performance of exam school students reflects selection bias, that is, the process by which exam school students are chosen, rather than causal impact.

Data from Chicago’s large exam school sector illustrate the elite illusion, while also laying the foundation for a causal story to which I’ll return shortly (these data are analyzed in Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017b) and Angrist et al. (2019b)).\textsuperscript{12} The left panel of Figure 3 explains why exam schools are so attractive to parents. This panel plots peer mean achievement—that is, the 8th grade test scores of an applicant’s 9th grade classmates—against the admissions tie-breaker, for a subset of applicants to the group of nine Chicago exam schools open in 2009-12. Applicants rank up to six schools, while exam schools prioritize applicants using a common composite index formed from an admissions test, middle school GPA, and 7th grade standardized test scores. This composite tie-breaker is the running variable for an RD design that reveals what happens when an applicant is offered an exam school seat.

Because Chicago has many exam schools, the city uses a version of the celebrated Gale and Shapley (1962) deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm to adjudicate exam-school assignment (DA is celebrated in the 2012 Economics Nobel awarded to Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley). As it happens, the Chicago DA implementation is well-approximated by a simpler algorithm known colorfully as serial dictatorship. Under serial dictatorship, an exam school applicant is sure to be offered a seat somewhere when they clear the lowest cutoff in the set of cutoffs associated with the schools they rank. In the context of school assignment using serial dictatorship, we call this the qualifying cutoff.\textsuperscript{13}

The left panel of Figure 3 shows a sharp jump in peer mean achievement for Chicago exam school applicants who clear their qualifying cutoff. This reflects the fact that most applicants offered an exam school seat take it. And applicants who enroll at one of Chicago’s selective enrollment high schools are sure to be seated in 9th grade classrooms filled with academically precocious peers, since only the relatively precocious make it in. The increase in peer achievement across the qualifying cutoff amounts to almost half of a standard deviation.

\textsuperscript{11}David Autor, Parag Pathak, and I founded Blueprint Labs in 2011. Since then, lab staff and research assistants have provided an incomparable environment for research on education and the labor market.

\textsuperscript{12}Related Blueprint exam-school research includes Idoux (2021), and Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2022). Dobbie and Fryer (2014) and Barrow et al. (2020) also use RD to study exam schools in New York and Chicago, respectively.

\textsuperscript{13}Applicants who clear their qualifying cutoff are sure to be seated somewhere because at least one school judges their application acceptable. Depending on their tie-breaker rank and preferences over schools, however, applicants may be offered a seat at a school they prefer to the school that determines their qualifying cutoff. The plots in Figure 3 were constructed by subtracting the qualifying cutoff from each applicant’s admissions tie-breaker, so that all applicants face a common qualifying cutoff of zero.
(the test scores used to measure peer quality have been scaled to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in the district as a whole).

Precocious peers notwithstanding, the offer of an exam school seat does not appear to increase learning. The right-hand panel of Figure 3 plots applicants’ ACT scores (a test taken mostly in 11th grade) against their tie-breaker values. This panel shows that exam-school applicants who clear their qualifying cutoff perform sharply worse on the ACT. Parents who enroll their children in one of Chicago’s selective enrollment high schools in anticipation of accelerated learning are destined, on average, for disappointment. What explains this? It takes a combination of IV and RD to untangle the forces behind this intriguing and unexpected negative impact. But first, some IV theory.

3 A Little LATE

Connecting econometric ideas with the world of heterogeneous potential outcomes introduced in Rubin (1974) and surveyed in Holland (1986), the LATE theorem offered a new understanding of empirical strategies involving IV and RD. The prize that Guido Imbens and I share is in recognition of the relevance of LATE for modern empirical practice.

Guido and I overlapped for only one year at Harvard, where we had both signed on as assistant professors. In the fall of 1990, starting my second year on the job, I welcomed Guido to Cambridge with a pair of interesting instrumental variables. The first instrument, coded from draft lottery numbers randomly assigned in the 1970s, generates variation in Vietnam-era veteran status (Angrist, 1990). The second instrument, quarter of birth, arguably close to randomly assigned or at least serendipitous, interacts with compulsory attendance laws to generate variation in highest grade completed (Angrist and Krueger, 1991).

The draft lottery instrument relies on the fact that lottery numbers randomly assigned to birthdays determined Vietnam-era conscription risk. Even in the 1960s and 1970s, however, most American soldiers were volunteers, as all are today. The quarter-of-birth instrument uses the fact that men who are born earlier in the year typically start school younger, and are therefore allowed to drop out of high school (on their 16th birthday) with less schooling completed than those born later. But most people complete high school regardless of their quarter of birth. Guido and I soon began asking each other: What, really, did we learn from draft-lottery and quarter-of-birth instruments?

An early result in our quest for a new understanding of IV was a solution to the problem of selection bias in an RCT with partial compliance. Even in a randomized clinical trial, some assigned to treatment may choose to opt out, a fact that has long vexed trialists. Angrist and Imbens (1991) proved that in a randomized trial with partial compliance, the average causal effect of treatment on the treated is identified provided the control group has no access to treatment. This is in spite of the fact that those who comply with treatment in the treatment arm are likely to be a highly select group.

Barrow et al. (2020) reports negative effects of Chicago exam-school offers on high school grades and the probability of attending a selective college. Dale and Krueger (2002) pioneered the study of the elite illusion in college, showing that college selectivity is unrelated to graduates’ earnings, once account is taken of the schools to which students applied and were admitted. Mountjoy and Hickman (2020) apply this research design to large samples of public university applicants in Texas.
Unfortunately for us, we were late to the partial-compliance party. Not long after releasing our first coauthored working paper, we learned of Bloom (1984). The Bloom Result (as Steve Pischke and I called it in Angrist and Pischke (2009)) can be stated as follows. Consider a clinical trial that offers treatment randomly. Proportion \( \pi \) receive treatment when offered, while the rest opt out. Indicate those who are offered treatment with dummy variable \( Z_i \), and those who take treatment with a dummy variable \( D_i \). Denote potential outcomes for subject \( i \) in the treated and untreated states by \( Y_{1i} \) and \( Y_{0i} \), respectively. The observed outcome is:

\[
Y_i = Y_{0i} + D_i[Y_{1i} - Y_{0i}].
\]

In other words, we see \( Y_{1i} \) for the treated and we see \( Y_{0i} \) for those not treated. \( Y_{1i} - Y_{0i} \) is the causal effect of treatment on individual \( i \), but this we can never see. We make do, therefore, with average treatment effects.

Bloom (1984) shows how to compute the average effect on the treated in this scenario. Let \( \delta \) be the effect of treatment assigned on \( Y_i \) (trialists call this the intention-to-treat effect or ITT for short). Then,

\[
E[Y_{1i} - Y_{0i}|D_i = 1] = \frac{\delta}{\pi}.
\]

What could be simpler? This is the IV estimand that uses treatment assigned, \( Z_i \), as an instrument for treatment received, \( D_i \). Yet, to this day, I’m often asked how it can be true that in a scenario where subjects assigned to treatment selectively decline treatment, the average causal effect on the treated is knowable. Remarkably, Howard Bloom derived this result from first principles, making no connection to IV.

The LATE theorem (Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist et al. (1996)) generalizes Bloom’s result. Maintaining the clinical trials analogy, let \( D_{1i} \) indicate subject \( i \)’s treatment status when assigned to treatment and let \( D_{0i} \) indicate subject \( i \)’s treatment status when assigned to control.\(^\text{15}\) In addition to the assumptions underpinning Bloom, we added one more: assignment to treatment either leaves treatment status unaffected or makes it more likely (formally, \( D_{1i} \geq D_{0i} \) for all \( i \); the direction of the inequality doesn’t matter). Given this restriction, which we called monotonicity, LATE says:

\[
E[Y_{1i} - Y_{0i}|D_{1i} > D_{0i}] = \frac{E[Y_i|Z_i = 1] - E[Y_i|Z_i = 0]}{E[D_i|Z_i = 1] - E[D_i|Z_i = 0]},
\]

where \( \pi_1 \) and \( \pi_0 \) are compliance rates in the group assigned to treatment and the group assigned to control, respectively. The right-hand-side of (4) is again the IV estimand using treatment assigned as an instrument for treatment received. Motivated by Angrist and Krueger (1991), Angrist and Imbens (1995) extends LATE to ordered treatments like years of schooling, while Angrist et al. (2000) covers continuous treatments and simultaneous equations models.

\(^\text{15}\)We owe this potential assignment notation to Gary Chamberlain. Writing me in November of 1991 with comments on an “early LATE draft,” Gary noted that LATE as we had derived it had a “mysterious random variable in Condition 1.” This was the error term we had used to model latent treatment assignments. Gary suggested we define \( D_{0i} \) and \( D_{1i} \) directly, without recourse to a latent-index model.
Ice Cream at Princeton, AIRtime at Harvard

At Princeton and then Harvard, I read and reread Chamberlain (1984), Newey (1985), and Newey and West (1987). But I was also lucky to be able to call on my Princeton Ph.D. advisor Whitney Newey and my Harvard colleague Gary Chamberlain in real life. Lengthy derivations begun in Whitney’s office led often to Thomas Sweet’s in Palmer Square, a reward for Whitney’s patience. As a new assistant professor in 1990, I apprenticed to Gary by co-teaching his undergraduate econometrics course, an experience I’ve been building on ever since.

In Angrist (1990), my job market paper, I used draft-lottery dummies as instruments for veteran status in a two-sample linear IV procedure detailed in Angrist and Krueger (1992). Motivated by the fact that Hearst et al. (1986) used the draft lottery to estimate veteran effects on mortality, I began exploring IV methods for nonlinear qualitative response models. With little beyond bivariate probit to show for my efforts, Newey suggested I seek new causal knowledge from biostatistics maven Jamie Robins at the Harvard School of Public Health.16

Robins advised me to abandon latent index models and turn instead to potential outcomes and the Rubin causal model. So I read and wrote Don Rubin.

Rubin’s reply reached me in Jerusalem, where I had taken a position in Fall 1991. In the meantime, Guido found Don as well. It was Rubin who put us “on AIR,” in Angrist et al. (1996), a follow-up to the 1994 paper, where, co-opting the Passover story, we redefined the four types of children (always-takers, never-takers, compliers, and defiers, described below). Along the way, we convinced Rubin of the utility of empirical strategies based on IV.

Convincing Don Rubin took some doing. His (September 1991) reply to me began: “Thanks for the copy of your paper on treatment effects ... I believe all the results, but I still cannot resonate to the approach.” Among other complaints, Rubin wrote: “I don’t know of any real success stories.” I responded in October 1991, writing from Jerusalem: “I will try to explain why I find the IV framework so useful,” going on to detail the draft lottery and the quarter-of-birth IV applications. Rubin replied with a much longer letter that marked the beginning of our three-way collaboration. He agreed that the draft lottery generates compelling instruments for Vietnam-era veteran status, but also wrote, “I want to make sure I really understand the assumptions you make without all the irrelevant linear model stuff.”

And so on, back and forth. Along the way, Guido and I embraced the language of potential outcomes and eventually became fluent in it. But not right away: initially, Rubin and I argued every point. Then, in June 1992, I emailed Guido: “Never mind all my whining [about Rubin] from the previous email. I believe I’ve figured out how to link our earlier papers to ‘the Rubin Way’ ... the key is to follow up on something I think Don originally suggested: to define counterfactuals for the 2*2 factorial experiment that manipulates both D and Z.” This double-indexing of potential outcomes allowed us to separate exclusion restrictions from independence assumptions, a feature of the LATE framework adopted in Angrist et al. (1996).

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16Angrist (1991) shows that, when the linear first stage implied by a latent-index model is a non-zero constant, the (linear) IV estimand using a single dummy instrument is an average treatment effect. This is implied by the LATE theorem because, in this scenario, \( D_{1i} - D_{0i} \) is a constant. But I didn’t know that at the time.
3.1 LATE for Charter School

The LATE theorem is formalized using the language of mathematical statistics. But the idea is pleasingly concrete and easy to grasp in practice. As in my undergraduate text with Steve Pischke (Angrist and Pischke, 2014), I’ll explain the LATE idea here through a research question that has occupied me for almost two decades: the causal effect of charter school attendance on learning.\footnote{My interest in charter schools dates to 2003, when Michael Goldstein, then CEO of the Match Charter High School, invited Kevin Lang and me to use MATCH admissions lotteries to estimate causal effects of MATCH attendance. This initial effort failed to pan out because we couldn’t get the requisite data on test scores. The first charter lottery analysis to which I contributed was released in 2009 (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2009), later published as Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2011).}

Charter schools are public schools that operate independently of traditional American public school districts. A charter (the right to operate a public school) is typically granted for a limited period, subject to renewal conditional on good performance. Charter schools are free to structure their curriculum and school environment. Many charter schools extend instruction time by running long school days and continuing school on weekends and over the summer. The most controversial difference between charters and traditional public schools is the fact that the teachers and staff who work at the former rarely belong to labor unions. By contrast, most big-city public school teachers work under teachers’ union contracts that regulate pay and working conditions, often in a very detailed manner.

The 2010 documentary film Waiting for Superman features schools belonging to the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP). KIPP schools are emblematic of the No Excuses approach to public education, a widely replicated urban charter model that features a long school day, an extended school year, selective teacher hiring, extensive data-driven feedback for teachers, student behavior norms, and a focus on traditional reading and math skills. The KIPP network serves a student body that is 95\% Black and Hispanic, with over 80\% of KIPP students poor enough to qualify for the federal government’s subsidized lunch program.\footnote{The case for No Excuses pedagogy begins with Martin Luther King Jr., who wrote in King (1967) that “Whatever pathology may exist in Negro families is far exceeded by this social pathology in the school system that refuses to accept a responsibility that no one else can bear and then scapegoats Negro families for failing to do the job.” The first quantitative analysis of the No Excuses paradigm is likely Ternstrom and Ternstrom (2004).}

The American debate over education reform often focuses on the achievement gap, shorthand for large test score differences by race and ethnicity. Because of its focus on minority students, KIPP is often central in this debate, with supporters pointing to the fact that non-White KIPP students have markedly higher test scores than non-White students from nearby schools. KIPP skeptics have argued that KIPP’s apparent success reflects the fact that KIPP attracts families whose children who are more likely to succeed anyway.

A randomized trial might prove decisive in the debate over attendance effects at schools like KIPP. Luckily, while seats at KIPP are not filled by binding random assignment, there’s a good deal of randomness in who gets one. This randomness comes from the fact that Massachusetts charter schools with more applicants than seats must offer their seats by lottery. Specifically, applicants are ordered according to a random lottery number, and offers made down this randomly ordered list until all available seats are taken.

A decade ago my collaborators and I collected data on KIPP Lynn middle school admissions...
lotteries, laying the foundation for charter school research published in Angrist et al. (2010a, 2012). At the time, the KIPP middle school in Lynn, Massachusetts was the first school of its kind in New England. Some KIPP applicants bypass the lottery—those with previously enrolled siblings are guaranteed admission, while a few applicants are categorically excluded (those too old for middle school, for example). Among the 371 applicants for 5th or 6th grade entry who were subject to random assignment in the four KIPP lotteries held from 2005-08 (and for whom we have post-application data on achievement), a total of 253 were offered a seat.

Perhaps surprisingly, a fair number of applicants offered a seat in the lottery failed to enroll come September. Some had moved away, while others ultimately preferred a traditional public school. Among those offered a seat, 199 (or about 79%) enrolled at KIPP the following school year. At the same time, 5 applicants (about 4.2%) not offered a seat at KIPP nevertheless found their way into KIPP. The effect of an offer on KIPP enrollment rates is $\frac{199}{253} - \frac{5}{118} \approx 0.74$. In an IV analysis where offers are used as an instrumental variable for KIPP attendance, this 0.74 effect of offers on enrollment is the relevant first stage.

The IV empirical strategy sketched here looks at KIPP attendance effects on test scores for tests taken at the end of the grade following the application grade (so these scores are from the end of 5th grade for those who applied in 4th and from the end of 6th grade for those who applied in 5th). As is common in research on student achievement, our data on scores are standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of scores in a reference population. In this case, the reference population contains all Massachusetts students in the relevant grade. Standardized scores are easily compared across populations and tests. As in many of Massachusetts’ poorer cities and towns, average math scores in Lynn fall about three tenths of a standard deviation below the state mean (written $-0.3\sigma$).

Among participants in KIPP entry lotteries, applicants offered a seat had standardized math scores close to zero ($-0.003$ to be precise), that is, near the state mean. Because KIPP applicants start with 4th grade scores that average roughly $0.3\sigma$ below the state mean, achievement at the level of the state average should be seen as impressive. By contrast, the average math score among those not offered a seat is about $-0.358\sigma$, a much more typical result for students residing in towns like Lynn.

Since lottery offers are randomly assigned, we can say with confidence that the offer of a seat at KIPP Lynn boosts math scores by an average of $0.355\sigma$, a large effect that’s also statistically precise, so we can be confident this isn’t a chance finding. What does an offer effect around $0.36\sigma$ tell us about the effects of KIPP Lynn attendance? IV methods convert KIPP offer effects into KIPP attendance effects. In this case, the instrumental variable is a dummy variable that equals one for KIPP applicants who receive offers and zero otherwise. As in the discussion of RCTs, let $Z_i$ denote this instrument. The causal effect of interest is that of $D_i$, a dummy indicating KIPP enrollment.

In general, three things are required of $Z_i$ for it to be a valid instrument:

I. $Z_i$ should have a causal effect on the variable we care about, in this case KIPP enrollment, $D_i$. As noted above, this causal effect is called the first stage.

II. $Z_i$ must also be randomly assigned or “as good as randomly assigned,” in the sense of being unrelated to the omitted variables we might like to control for, in this case,
variables like KIPP applicants’ family background or motivation to enroll. This is called the independence assumption.

III. Finally, IV logic requires an exclusion restriction. The exclusion restriction postulates a single measured channel through which the instrument, $Z_i$, affects outcomes. Here, the exclusion restriction amounts to the claim that the 0.355σ score differential between lottery winners and losers is entirely attributable to the .74 win-loss difference in KIPP attendance rates, that is, to the effect of $Z_i$ on $D_i$.

IV empirical strategies characterize a chain reaction leading from the instrument to student achievement. The first link in this causal chain (the first stage) connects randomly assigned offers with KIPP attendance, while the second link (the one we’re after) connects KIPP attendance with achievement. By virtue of the independence assumption and the exclusion restriction, the product of these two links generates the effect of offers on test scores:

$$\text{Effect of offers on scores} = \{\text{Effect of offers on attendance}\} \times \{\text{Effect of attendance on scores}\}.$$ 

The causal effect of KIPP attendance can therefore be written:

$$\text{Effect of attendance on scores} = \frac{\{\text{Effect of offers on scores}\}}{\{\text{Effect of offers on attendance}\}}.$$ (6)

This is a version of equation (5), expressed here in words. The effect of the instrument (lottery offers) on outcomes (test scores) plays a central role in the IV story and therefore has a special name: this is the reduced form, denoted by $\delta$ in (5). Dividing the reduced form (0.355σ) by the first stage, the KIPP attendance effect is:

$$0.48\sigma \approx \frac{0.355\sigma}{0.745} = \frac{(-0.003\sigma) - (-0.358\sigma)}{0.787 - 0.042}.$$ (7)

Almost half a standard deviation gain in math scores is a remarkable result. Few education-related interventions have such large effects.19

It’s one thing to be able to compute an IV estimate and another to know what it means. Children may differ in the extent to which they benefit from KIPP. For some, perhaps a group that’s highly motivated with a supportive family environment, the choice of KIPP Lynn or a Lynn public school matters little; the causal effect of KIPP attendance on such applicants is zero. For others, KIPP attendance may matter greatly. LATE is an average of these different individual causal effects. In particular, LATE is an average causal effect for the population of children whose KIPP enrollment status is determined solely by the KIPP lottery.

19The full econometric analysis of KIPP is more involved than described here. Like many instrumental variables, the KIPP lottery offer instrument is valid only after conditioning on factors (like application year and entry grade) that determine the probability of being offered seat. Other controls, such as past achievement, are included to increase statistical precision. The complete analysis also allows for the fact that some children spend more time at KIPP than others between the time they apply and the time outcomes are measured. See Angrist et al. (2012) for details.
As I’ve mentioned, LATE is illuminated by the biblical story of Passover, which explains that there are four types of children, each with characteristic behaviors. Table 1 classifies applicants named Alvaro, Normando, and Camila, as a well as the fourth type of child, a defier. Applicant names hint at the way applicants would respond were they to win or lose the lottery. The columns in Table 1 indicate attendance choices made when \( Z_i = 0 \), while rows indicate choices made when \( Z_i = 1 \). The table covers all possible scenarios for every applicant, not only the scenarios we observe. In other words, the table records potential choices made when \( Z_i = 1 \), denoted \( D_{1i} \), and potential choices made when \( Z_i = 0 \), denoted \( D_{0i} \). Potential choices are like potential outcomes: for any given applicant, we see only one or the other.

Never-takers and always-takers are on the main diagonal: win or lose, their choice of school is unchanged. Always-takers like Alvaro are dying to go to KIPP; if they lose the KIPP lottery, their mothers find a way to enroll them in KIPP anyway, perhaps by re-applying. Never-takers like Normando worry about long school days and lots of homework. Normando doesn’t really want to go to KIPP, and refuses to do so upon learning that he won the lottery. For Normando, \( D_{1i} = D_{0i} = 0 \), while, for Alvaro, \( D_{1i} = D_{0i} = 1 \). At the bottom left, compliers like Camila are happy to go to KIPP if they win a seat, but stoically accept the verdict if they lose. Camila complies with her lottery offer, attending KIPP when she wins but not otherwise. In other words, Camila has \( D_{1i} = 1, D_{0i} = 0 \).

The term complier highlights the link between IV and the RCTs we aim to mimic with non-experimental empirical strategies. Many randomized trials randomize only the opportunity to be treated, while the decision to comply with the treatment protocol remains voluntary and non-random. RCT compliers are those who take treatment when the offer of treatment is made, but not otherwise. With lottery instruments, LATE is the effect of KIPP attendance on Camila and other compliers like her who enroll (take treatment) when offered a seat in the lottery, but not otherwise. IV methods are uninformative for Alvaro and Normando because the lottery instrument is unrelated to their treatment status.

The defiers in Table 1 are those who enroll in KIPP only when not offered a seat in the lottery. Such perverse behavior makes IV estimates hard to interpret. With defiers as well as compliers in the data, the average effect of a KIPP offer can be zero even if everyone benefits from KIPP attendance. Luckily, defiant behavior is unlikely in charter lotteries and many other IV settings. We therefore assume such behavior is rare to nonexistent. This is the monotonicity assumption introduced in Imbens and Angrist (1994): the instrument is presumed to push affected applicants in one direction only.

The LATE theorem says that for any randomly assigned instrument with a non-zero first stage, satisfying both monotonicity and an exclusion restriction, the ratio of reduced form to first stage is the average causal effect of treatment on compliers. Each IV assumption plays a distinct role in establishing this: with no first stage, there’s no charter experiment, while the independence assumption ensures the reduced form captures the causal effect of the instrument. The exclusion restrictions asserts that the reduced form is explained by KIPP attendance alone, while monotonicity plus exclusion are what make the KIPP attendance effect we seek proportional to the lottery-offer reduced form. These components lead to a simple formula for causal effects on compliers.

The LATE framework is sometimes seen as limiting the relevance of econometric inference. Yet, the population of compliers is a group we’d very much like to learn about. In the KIPP
example, compliers are children likely to be seated at KIPP were the school to expand and offer additional seats in a lottery. In Massachusetts, the number of charter seats is capped by law, so the consequences of legislated charter expansion is central to state education policy (since the founding of Blueprint Labs, Massachusetts has seen had two ballot initiatives on this matter). Cohodes et al. (2021) tackles the question of whether lottery-based estimates of charter effects predict learning gains when charter schools like KIPP are allowed to open new campuses and add seats. This investigation shows IV estimates using charter lotteries to be a remarkably reliable guide to the performance of newly-opened charter campuses.

No Excuses for Not Closing the Achievement Gap

The LATE theorem can be interpreted as saying that treatment is randomly assigned for compliers. Consequently, the LATE framework identifies not only average treatment effects, but also distributions of potential outcomes for compliers. To see this, suppose first that treatment, $D_i$, is randomly assigned in a stratified randomized trial, with strata encoded in covariate $X_i$. Conditional random assignment implies that:

$$\{Y_{1i}, Y_{0i}\} \perp D_i|X_i. \quad (8)$$

Differences in treatment and control means within strata therefore yield conditional average causal effects:

$$E[Y_i|D_i = 1, X_i] - E[Y_i|D_i = 0, X_i] = E[Y_{1i}|D_i = 1, X_i] - E[Y_{0i}|D_i = 0, X_i] = E[Y_{1i}|X_i] - E[Y_{0i}|X_i] \quad (9)$$

$$= E[Y_{1i} - Y_{0i}|X_i].$$

Now, replace $Y_i$ with $Y_i^*(c) \equiv 1(Y_i < c)$ for any constant, $c$: expressions (8) holds for any function of $Y_i$, so it holds for $Y_i^*(c)$. Substituting $Y_i^*(c)$ for $Y_i$ in (9), we have,

$$E[Y_i^*(c)|D_i = 1, X_i] - E[Y_i^*(c)|D_i = 0, X_i] = Pr[Y_{1i} < c|X_i] - Pr[Y_{0i} < c|X_i].$$

The right-hand side of this expression is the difference in the distributions of $Y_{1i}$ and $Y_{0i}$ within strata, evaluated at $c$. Such distributional comparisons feature in RCTs evaluating life-saving vaccines and treatment regimens, where the distribution of interest is that of survival time. RCTs likewise reveal marginal distributions of potential outcomes ($Pr[Y_{ji} < c]; j = 1, 2$), as well differences between them at any point.

The LATE analog of the conditional independence expressed by (8) says that

$$\{Y_{1i}, Y_{0i}\} \perp D_i|D_{1i} > D_{0i}. \quad (10)$$

This expression is a consequence of the fact that, by virtue of monotonicity, $Z_i = D_i$ for compliers. Therefore,

$$E[D_i|Y_{1i}, Y_{0i}, D_{1i} > D_{0i}] = E[Z_i|Y_{1i}, Y_{0i}, D_{1i} > D_{0i}] = E[Z_i],$$

where the second equals sign uses the IV independence and exclusion assumptions. Expression (10) is remarkable because $D_i$ itself is not randomly assigned. Yet, for compliers, $D_i$ is independent of potential outcomes as if randomly assigned in an RCT.
Of course, compliers are not labeled as such in any data set. Even so, a few simple formulas (based on Imbens and Rubin (1997) and developed further by my former Ph.D. student and MIT colleague Alberto Abadie) yield potential outcome distributions for the compliers in your data (Abadie, 2002, 2003). The importance of potential outcome distributions is easily grasped in analyses of charter school effects. Recall that our KIPP study was motivated in part by Black-White achievement gaps. The top of Figure 4 gives context for this concern by depicting the distribution of 4th grade scores for applicants to Boston charter middle schools. The two panels in the upper part of the figure show score distributions by race, tabulated separately for treated and untreated compliers. Treated compliers are compliers who attended a charter middle school, while untreated compliers did not. Because these are 4th grade scores, while middle school begins in 5th or 6th grade, the two sides of the figure are similar. In particular, both show score distributions for Black applicants shifted to the left of the corresponding score distributions for Whites.

By the end of 8th grade, the picture has changed markedly. This is documented in the bottom of Figure 4, which again shows score distributions by race, separately for treated and untreated compliers. Treated compliers finish middle school at a Boston charter in 8th grade. Like KIPP Lynn, Boston charter schools mostly employ No Excuses pedagogy. No Excuses charters boost achievement for most of their students, but those who enter the furthest behind tend to gain the most from charter attendance. Consequently, Black charter students, who start middle school with lower baseline scores, see their learning accelerated more by charter attendance than do Whites. This differential impact is reflected in the bottom-left panel of the figure, which shows that, among treated compliers, the Black and White 8th grade score distributions have converged. Differences in 8th grade score distributions for untreated compliers, by contrast (shown at the bottom right of the figure), have changed little from baseline, with Whites still clearly ahead of Blacks.

3.2 Where Do Babies Come From?

IV estimation of the labor supply consequences of childbearing is motivated in part by the 20th century rise in married women’s labor force participation, a trend that parallels declining marital fertility. Perhaps declining fertility explains increasing female labor supply. But the case for omitted variables bias in this context is clear: mothers with weak labor force attachment or low earnings potential may have more children than mothers with strong labor force attachment or high earnings potential. And causality might just as well run the other way, with increased female employment driving down fertility. This makes the correlation between family size and mothers’ employment or hours worked hard to interpret.

Bill Evans and I used two IV empirical strategies to overcome selection bias and capture causal effects of childbearing on parents’ labor supply. The LATE theorem implies that these

\[Pr[Y_{ji} < c|D_{1i} > D_{0i}] = \frac{E[D_i'(1 - D_i)^{1-j}Y^*_i(c)|Z_i = 1] - E[D_i'(1 - D_i)^{1-j}Y^*_i(c)|Z_i = 0]}{(-1)^{1-j}(E[1|Z_i = 1] - E[D_i|Z_i = 0])},\]

where, as before, \(Y^*_i(c) \equiv 1(Y_i < c)\). Potential outcome densities can be obtained by replacing indicator functions with kernels; see Angrist et al. (2016) for details.

20See Angrist et al. (2013) and Chabrier et al. (2016) for more on this pattern of effects.

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two instruments, though applied to the same causal relationship, need not identify the same average causal effect. Different sets of compliers may be affected differently by the same intervention or treatment. Angrist and Evans (1998) and Angrist and Fernández-Val (2013) show that this is more than a theoretical possibility. Causal effects of childbearing depend, at least in part, on where the babies in question come from.

The first Angrist and Evans (1998) fertility instrument indicates the occurrence of twins at second birth in samples of mothers with at least two children (Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) is the first study to use twinning to instrument family size). The second instrument, also coded for women who have had at least two children, indicates whether first- and second-born children are of the same sex. American parents show little preference for boys or girls (the probability of having a second birth is similar whether the first-born is male or female). But they do seek a diversified sibling-sex portfolio: when first and second-born children are both boys or both girls, the likelihood of a third child jumps.

The twins first stage in 1980 Census data is about .6, an estimate reported in column 2 of Table 2 (reproduced from Angrist and Fernández-Val (2013)). This means that 40 percent of mothers with two or more children would have had a third birth without twinning, while a multiple second birth increases this proportion to 100 percent. Validity of the twins instrument rests on the claim that multiple births are unrelated to potential outcomes indexed against childbearing, and that a multiple birth affects labor supply solely by increasing fertility.22

The same-sex first stage is an order of magnitude smaller than the twins first stage. Parents of a same-sex sibship are about six percentage points more likely to have a third child than are parents of a mixed-sex sibship. This is documented in column 4 of Table 2 (38% of mixed-sex parents have a third child). Validity of the same-sex instrument rests on the claim that sibling sex composition is essentially random and affects mothers’ labor supply solely by increasing fertility.

Twins-IV estimates suggest a third-birth reduces mothers’ weeks worked by a little over 3 weeks, with an employment reduction of about .08 points. These results, shown in column 3 of Table 2, are smaller in absolute value than the corresponding ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates reported in the first column of the table. The latter, computing using a set of controls listed below the table, suggest a third birth reduces mothers’ employment rates by around 18 percentage points, accompanied by 9 fewer weeks of work. In view of the twins-IV estimates, however, these large OLS estimates are almost certainly exaggerated by selection bias.

IV estimates constructed using the same-sex instrument, reported in column 5 of Table 2, are substantially more negative than the corresponding twins-IV estimates (though still much smaller than OLS). Perhaps the gap between the two sets of IV estimates is a chance finding, due to sampling variance in the estimates. The last column of Table 2 reports two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of third-birth effects computed using twins and same-sex instruments together, along with the associated over-identification test statistic, which implicitly tests the null hypothesis that the underlying one-instrument-at-a-time IV estimates are valid.

These conditions are unlikely to be met in a contemporary sample because the twin birth rate is boosted by in-vitro fertilization (IVF) and related fertility treatments. IVF is now used much more widely than in 1980, and is more common among older and more educated women.

22These conditions are unlikely to be met in a contemporary sample because the twin birth rate is boosted by in-vitro fertilization (IVF) and related fertility treatments. IVF is now used much more widely than in 1980, and is more common among older and more educated women.
estimates capture the same causal effect. This test generates p-values of .02 and .06, implying that the twins and same-sex IV estimates are statistically distinguishable, that is, differences between them are unlikely to be due to chance alone.\textsuperscript{23}

In Angrist and Fernández-Val (2013), my former Ph.D. student Iván Fernández-Val and I argue that differences between twins and same-sex IV estimates reflect differences in the populations of twins and same-sex compliers. Since all mothers of second-born twins have at least three children, there are no twins never-takers. LATE logic therefore implies that twins instruments identify the average effect of a third child on \textit{all} women who choose to have only two. Formally, since $D_{1i} = 1$ for all $i$,

$$E[Y_{1i} - Y_{0i}|D_{1i} = 1, D_{0i} = 0] = E[Y_{1i} - Y_{0i}|D_{0i} = 0]$$

$$= E[Y_{1i} - Y_{0i}|D_{0i} = 0, Z_i = 0]$$

$$= E[Y_{1i} - Y_{0i}|D_i = 0].$$

In other words, twins instruments reveal the effect of a third birth on women who choose to have small families (the second equals sign above uses the independence assumption and exclusion restriction; the third uses the fact that, for a twins instrument, $D_i = 0$ if and only if $D_{0i} = Z_i = 0$). The same-sex instrument, by contrast, captures childbearing effects on women who can be nudged into additional childbearing by the desire for a mixed-sex sibship.

Why are differences between twins and same-sex compliers \textit{economically} important? In the Gronau (1977) model of labor supply, services like child care can be purchased or provided in the home. The choice between these options is determined by a mother’s market wage. Consistent with the fact that they choose smaller families, twins compliers are especially likely to be college-educated, while college education and the higher wages education brings encourage out-of-home care. This facilitates mothers’ labor force participation in the wake of a third birth. Same-sex compliers, by contrast, are about two-thirds as likely as the typical mother of two to have a college degree, and are therefore more likely than twins compliers to use home child care in response to a third birth. Reliance on home care boosts the (negative) labor-supply consequences of childbirth.\textsuperscript{24}

This tale of two instruments shows how the LATE theorem can reconcile disparate results from two natural experiments when these experiments identify features of the same underlying causal relationship. With a clear description of distinct complier groups in hand, economic reasoning suggests a theoretically-grounded explanation for why differences in complier characteristics lead to differences in impact.

\textsuperscript{23}2SLS combines multiple instruments by using the fitted values generated by a first-stage equation with all instruments included on the right hand side as a single combined instrument. 2SLS uses multiple instruments efficiently, while neatly accommodating covariates. Models with more than one instrument for a single causal effect are said to be over-identified. The over-identification test statistic is proportional to the R-squared from a regression of 2SLS residuals on the instruments and covariates included in the first stage. See, e.g., Hausman (1983) for details.

\textsuperscript{24}College graduation rates among compliers can be computed and compared using the fact that the probability a complier has Bernoulli characteristic $x_i = 1$, relative to the marginal probability that $x_i = 1$, is given by the ratio of the first stage conditional on $x_i = 1$ to the unconditional first stage. See Angrist and Pischke (2009) for details. Angrist and Fernández-Val (2013) discusses differences between twins and same-sex compliers besides education.
4 Constructing Causal Stories

My Blueprint Labs colleagues and I have uncovered many surprising causal stories. I’ll finish this lecture with one of the most intriguing, a combination of IV and RD empirical strategies that resolves the puzzle of negative Chicago exam school effects. As a reminder, the challenge I set out in Section 2 is to explain why offers of a seat at one of the Windy City’s coveted selective enrollment high schools appear to reduce learning rather than increase it.

Economic reasoning is all about alternatives. What’s the alternative to an exam school? For most applicants to Chicago exam schools, the leading non-exam alternative is a traditional public school. But many of Chicago’s rejected exam-school applicants enroll in charter schools. The offer of an exam-school seat therefore reduces the likelihood of charter-school attendance. Specifically, exam-school offers divert applicants away from high schools in the Noble Network of charter schools. Noble, deploying pedagogy much like KIPP’s, is one of Chicago’s most visible charter providers, enrolling 40% of the city’s 9th grade charter students.

Also like KIPP, convincing evidence on Noble effectiveness comes from admissions lotteries: when their campuses are over-subscribed, Noble schools offer seats by random assignment. Noble applicants seated at Noble schools as a result of these admissions lotteries have higher ACT scores as a result (Davis and Heller (2019) is the first study using lotteries to document Noble effectiveness).

This evidence of Noble impact can be seen in Panel A of Figure 5. The x-axis shows effects of lottery offers on years enrolled at Noble; this is the Noble first stage for an IV setup that uses a dummy indicating Noble lottery offers as an instrument for Noble enrollment (I switch here to years enrolled rather than a dummy indicating any charter attendance because the time Noble students spend at Noble ahead of their ACT tests varies from one student to another). Panel A has another feature that distinguishes it from the simpler KIPP analysis: this plot shows estimates for two groups, one for Noble applicants who live in Chicago’s lowest-income neighborhoods (labeled “Tier 1”) and one for Noble applicants who live in higher-income areas (“Tier 3”).

Recall the IV chain reaction: the reduced-form effect of an instrument on outcomes equals the causal effect of interest times the corresponding first stage. Each point in Panel A of Figure 5, which has coordinates given by (first stage, reduced form), therefore implies an IV estimate. In this case, we have:

\[
\text{Effect of Noble enrollment on ACT scores} = \frac{\{\text{Effect of Noble offers on ACT scores}\}}{\{\text{Effect of Noble offers on Noble enrollment}\}}.
\]

For Tier 1 applicants, this IV estimate is \(0.35 = 0.18 \times 0.50\), while for Tier 3 the IV estimate is \(0.33 = 0.26 \times 0.77\).

For Noble applicants from both tiers, these first-stage and reduced-form effects imply an impressive yearly Noble enrollment impact of about a third of a standard deviation. A line drawn through these two points—plus the origin—fits well (the line is depicted in the figure, but the origin is not). Moreover, since the fitted line has an intercept of zero, its

\[25\]Like Figure 3, this figure is derived from exhibits in Angrist et al. (2019b).

\[26\]Most Chicago public school students are low-income; tiers classify relative income within the city.
slope ("rise over run") is given by the two IV estimates that lie on it (empirically, the slope of the line comes out in-between the two estimates, at 0.34σ). Finally, the fact that the line connecting IV estimates for different groups runs through the origin substantiates an exclusion restriction which says: in a group for which Noble offers are unrelated to Noble enrollment, we should expect to see no reduced-form effect of Noble offers on test scores.

How consistent is the evidence for a Noble enrollment effect on the order of .34σ per year? The blue points plotted in the upper right area of Panel C of Figure 5 show first-stage and reduced-form Noble offer effects for 14 groups (2 more tiers and 10 groups defined by demographic characteristics related to race, sex, family income, and baseline scores). Although not a perfect fit, these points cluster around a line with slope 0.36σ, close to the slope of the line in Panel A. Again, consistent with an exclusion restriction that attributes reduced-form effects of Noble offers on test scores to first-stage effects of Noble offers on Noble enrollment, the fitted line passes through the origin.

The fact that the line in Panel C fits reasonably well bears a digression. As noted in the discussion of twins and same-sex instruments in Section 3.2, over-identification tests compare alternative IV estimates of the same causal effect. In a constant-effects framework, alternative IV estimates of the Noble enrollment effect should be similar unless one of the instruments is invalid. Yet, as we’ve seen, LATEs using different instruments can differ even when all instruments are valid. Even in the LATE framework, however, the fact that the reduced form is proportional to the corresponding first stage has testable implications. In particular, reduced-form effects associated with a particular first stage should not be implausibly large, and reduced-form effects of instruments for which the first stage is zero should be zero too. These restrictions hold even in the absence of constant causal effects, though constant effects is a simple way of motivating them.  

At the end of Section 2, I promised a resolution of the puzzle posed by negative exam school qualification effects seen in Figure 3. What do the Noble IV estimates in Panel A of Figure 5 have to do with effects of exam-schools? The answer appears in Panel B of Figure 5, which complements the RD plots in Figure 3 with an added twist. The gray line in Panel B shows, as we should expect, that exam school enrollment jumps for applicants who clear their qualifying cutoff (qualifying applicants are offered an exam-school seat somewhere). Specifically, qualification boosts years enrolled at an exam school by 0.61. At the same time, the red line in Panel B shows that exam-school qualification reduces years of Noble enrollment by 0.37. This is the diversionary impact of exam school offers on Noble enrollment.

IV allows us to go out on a limb with strong and potentially falsifiable claims regarding the mechanism underlying a particular set of causal effects. Here’s a strong causal claim: the primary force driving the reduced-form impact of exam-school qualification on ACT scores is the diversion seen in Panel B, that is, the impact exam-school offers have on Noble enrollment. In this account of exam-school offer reduced forms, exam-school offers leave achievement (and other outcomes discussed in Angrist et al. (2019b)) unchanged for exam-school applicants not diverted from Noble.

27Building on Balke and Pearl (1997) and Imbens and Rubin (1997), LATE-compatible tests of instrument validity are developed in Heckman and Vytlačil (2005), Kitagawa (2015), Huber and Mellace (2015), and Frandsen et al. (2019). Angrist et al. (2010b) uses the “no first stage, no reduced form” restriction to assess the validity of twins and same-sex instruments for family size. Sun and Wüthrich (2022) introduces a class of IV estimators that impose these sorts of restrictions.
In support of this claim, note first that the points plotted in red in Panel C of Figure 5 lie well to the left of zero on the x-axis. The x-coordinates for these points mark the effect of exam-school qualification on Noble enrollment for particular groups of applicants. Because exam-school offers divert many exam-school applicants away from Noble, these estimates are negative (as with the blue points, there’s a red point for each of the 14 groups defined by residential tier and demographic characteristics).

We’ve already seen that Noble applicants offered a seat in a Noble admissions lottery realize large ACT math score gains as a result. With this in mind, consider exam-school offers as an instrument for Noble enrollment. If exam school qualification reduces time at Noble by 0.37 years, and each year of Noble enrollment boosts ACT math scores by about 0.36 standard deviations, as suggested by the line plotted in Panel C of Figure 5, we should expect reduced-form effects of exam school qualification to be about $-0.13\sigma$. This is roughly consistent with the set of reduced-form exam-qualification estimates plotted in red at the bottom left of Panel C (the fit isn’t perfect; the reduced-form qualification effects in the figure cluster closer to $-0.15$ than to $-0.13$, but this small shortfall can be attributed to sampling variance).

The causal story told here postulates diversion away from charter schools as the primary mechanism by which Chicago exam school offers affect achievement. In other words, it’s Noble enrollment that generates an exclusion restriction when we use exam-school offers as an instrument. Again, as in Panel A, the line drawn in Panel C runs through the origin. This exclusion restriction therefore leaves us totally committed to the diversion hypothesis: in applicant groups where exam-school offers have little or no effect on charter-school enrollment, these offers are predicted to leave ACT scores unchanged. The reduced-form and first-stage estimates plotted in the figure need not have aligned this way. It’s revealing to know that they do.

5 Empirical Economics Gets Serious

I computed the IV estimates in my Princeton Ph.D. thesis on a massive mainframe computer using 9-track tape and costly leased storage space on a crowded communal hard drive. Princeton graduate students mastered IBM job control language, the better to manipulate tape reels the size of a cheesecake (overwrite your tape in haste, repent at leisure). Thankfully, empirical work today is less labor-intensive.

What else has improved in the modern empirical era? In Angrist and Pischke (2010), Steve Pischke and I coined the phrase “credibility revolution.” By this, we meant economists’ increasing use of transparent empirical strategies designed to answer specific causal questions. Previously, econometric analyses aimed mostly to estimate parameters governing the behavior of an economic model, paying little attention to the sources of variation underpinning a particular set of econometric estimates. Empirical strategies emphasizing research design and sources of variation have yielded a steady flow of credible causal conclusions. Card (2022) traces the intellectual roots of the shift towards design-focused applications.

Growing interest in credible identification of causal effects has also fueled a wave of methodological econometric innovation that continues today. Much of the design-focused methodological agenda builds on Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) propensity score theorem.
The theorem contributed to the credibility revolution by focusing econometricians’ attention on the process determining treatment assignment rather than on models for outcomes. Dehejia and Wahba (1999) was the first econometric study to demonstrate the value of the propensity score for applied work, while Hahn (1998) and Hirano et al. (2003) raised important new theoretical questions about the score.

More recently, Belloni et al. (2014) and Chernozhukov et al. (2018) use machine learning to model the propensity score while also modeling outcomes. These contributions can be seen as extending the Robins (2000) notion of double robustness to a wider class of empirical strategies. In principle, lasso and related ML tools offer a data-driven, theoretically-principled scheme to select from among many possible control variables. At the same time, Wüthrich and Zhu (2021) argue that in regression applications where the number of candidate controls is high but below sample size, OLS with all controls works well (though in some cases, the good performance of OLS with many controls requires use of the many-covariate-robust standard errors introduced by Cattaneo et al. (2018)). ML for instrument selection, implemented as suggested by Belloni et al. (2012), seems ill-suited for my type of IV application (for evidence on this point, see Angrist and Frandsen (2022)).

A distinctive RD methodology continues to bloom. In a cascade of contributions, econometricians tackle the vexing details of nonparametric RD bandwidth choice (as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and Calonico et al. (2017)). Nonparametric RD also requires a modicum of continuity—yet, Kolesár and Rothe (2018) show how we can sometimes make do with a discrete running variable. De Chaisemartin and Behaghel (2020) solve estimation problems arising in RD designs when cutoffs are behaviorally determined, as is the case with the RD designs used in our lab’s work on schools.

The outsized role played by IV in modern empirical work has prompted an explosion of research into the finite-sample behavior of IV estimators. Influential contributions like Staiger and Stock (1997), Stock and Yogo (2005), and Moreira (2003) (to name a few) were motivated by the Bound et al. (1995) critique of the heavily over-identified models estimated in Angrist and Krueger (1991). Research on the finite sample behavior of IV estimators is recently summarized in Andrews et al. (2019). My view, at odds with many theorists’, is that old-fashioned IV inference is often satisfactory. In Angrist and Kolesár (2021), Michal Kolesár and I argue that, when it comes to just-identified IV, at least, worries about weak instruments are overblown.

I’m looking forward to solutions to the many problems my labmates and I encounter in our empirical work on causal effects. These include our need of new tools for estimation and inference in empirical strategies combining research design with market design (key identification results appear in (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2017a, 2022)). Inference with clustered data remains as vexing as ever, though Abadie et al. (2017) makes the clustering question easier to address. RD is not foolproof: working on Angrist et al. (2019a), I was surprised to learn that school enrollment is an easily-manipulated running variable. More and better solutions for this sort of problem, as in Gerard et al. (2020), would be welcome.

A few notes in a minor key: empirical economics is more exciting and relevant than ever, but undergraduate econometric instruction has yet to fully embrace modern empirical strategies. Angrist and Pischke (2017) argues that compelling empirical applications are the way forward in the classroom. In the domain of research on schools, I worry that hostility to standardized testing may cripple the measurement of school effectiveness (Olson and Jerald...
documents anti-testing trends). My labmates and I aspire to measure school quality fairly. Recently, for example, we’ve shown how to mitigate racial bias and the elite illusion in school ratings (Angrist et al., 2017b, 2021a,b). Yet, without assessing their reading skills, how are we to know whether children are learning to read?

I’ll conclude by saying that I’m proud to be part of the contemporary empirical economics enterprise and gratified beyond words to be recognized for contributing to it. Back at Princeton in the late 1980s, my graduate classmates and I chuckled reading Leamer’s (1983) lament that “no economist takes another economist’s empirical work seriously.” This is no longer true. Empirical work today aspires to craft convincing causal stories. Not that every effort succeeds, far from it. But, as any economics job market candidate will tell you, empirical work carefully executed and clearly explained is taken seriously indeed. I hope that today’s Ph.D. students will join me in seeing this as a measure of our enterprise’s success.
References


Figure 1. Class Size in 1991 by Initial Enrollment Count, Actual Average Size and as Predicted by Maimonides’ Rule

Notes: Average and predicted class size in Israeli 4th-grade classes in 1991, conditional on enrollment. Predictions use Maimonides Rule.
Notes: This figure describes qualification rates for applicants to one of NYC’s most selective screened schools, Townsend Harris (TH). The sample consists of applicants for 9th grade seats applying to TH in 2011-2013. The leftmost pair of bars compares all TH applicants whose baseline (6th grade math) scores fall in the upper and lower quartiles of the baseline score distribution. Other paired bars compare conditional qualification rates for applicants whose tie-breaker values lie within shrinking bandwidths around the TH cutoff. Bandwidths are estimated as suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), using a uniform kernel. Qualification is defined as clearing the relevant TH cutoff.
Figure 3. Peer Baseline and ACT Math Effects at Qualifying Cutoffs for Chicago Exam Schools

Notes: This figure plots peer baseline math scores (Panel A) and ACT math scores (Panel B) against the exam school admissions composite. The sample consists of Chicago exam school applicants applying to at least one Noble charter school in the 2009-2012 application years. Baseline scores are taken from the 8th grade math Illinois Standards Achievement Test; ACT scores are from tests taken primarily in 11th grade. Baseline and ACT scores are standardized to have mean zero and unit standard deviation among the Chicago Public School district’s test-taking population. A student’s peers are all the other 9th graders enrolled at the same school. The running variable is centered around the qualifying cutoff. Applicants who clear their cutoff are offered an exam school seat. Plotted points are averages in 10-unit windows; lines in the plots are estimated conditional mean functions smoothed using local linear regression (LLR). The LLR uses a triangular kernel and the kernel bandwidth is computed as suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). All variables are plotted after partialling out saturated qualifying-cutoff-by-tier-by-application-year fixed effects.
Figure 4. Charter Schools Close the Achievement Gap

Panel A: Before Application (4th Grade Scores)

Panel B: After Application (8th Grade Scores)

Notes: This figure depicts the distribution of math scores for treated charter-offer compliers, separately by race. Baseline (pre-application) scores are from 4th grade, while post-application scores are from 8th grade. The sample includes first-time applicants to seven Boston charter middle schools with 5th or 6th grade entry. These applicants were seeking seats in the 2005-2006 through 2008-2009 school years (see Walters (2018) for details). Complier distributions are estimated as described in Appendix A of Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2018).
Figure 5. Explaining Chicago Exam School Effects with Charter Enrollment

A. Two Noble Offer Effects

![Graph showing reduced form offer effects for Tier 1 and Tier 3 applicants.]

Tier 1 applicants: 
IV = 0.18/0.50 = 0.35

Tier 3 applicants: 
IV = 0.26/0.77 = 0.33

B. Charter-School and Exam-School Enrollment at the QC

![Graph showing enrollment rates against exam school composite score.]

C. Noble Enrollment Declines Explain Negative Exam-School Effects

![Graph showing exam and noble offer effects for 14 covariate-defined groups.]

Notes: Panel A plots Noble offer effects for the Tier 1 and Tier 3 applicant groups. Panel B plots exam and Noble enrollment rates against the exam school admissions composite score. Panel C is a visual instrumental variable (VIV) plot of exam and Noble offer effects for a set of 14 covariate-defined groups. Exam effects are plotted in red; Noble effects are plotted in blue. Covariate-specific estimates are computed one at a time in the relevant subsamples. The slope of the line through these estimates is 0.34 in Panel A and 0.36 in Panel C. Fitted lines are forced to pass through the origin. Whiskers in Panel C mark 95% confidence intervals.
Table 1. The Four Types of Children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lottery losers</th>
<th>Lottery winners</th>
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<tr>
<td>$Z_i = 0$</td>
<td>$Z_i = 1$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Doesn't attend KIPP</td>
<td>Attends KIPP</td>
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<tr>
<td>$D_{0i} = 0$</td>
<td>$D_{0i} = 1$</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(Normando)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attends KIPP</td>
<td>Compliers</td>
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<tr>
<td>$D_{1i} = 1$</td>
<td>(Camila)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lottery losers</td>
<td>Lottery winners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: KIPP = Knowledge Is Power Program.
Table 2. IV Estimates of the Effects of Family Size on Labor Supply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>OLS (1)</th>
<th>First Stage Estimates (2)</th>
<th>IV Estimates (3)</th>
<th>First Stage Estimates (4)</th>
<th>IV Estimates (5)</th>
<th>2SLS Estimates (6)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Weeks worked</td>
<td>20.83</td>
<td>-8.98</td>
<td>0.603</td>
<td>-3.28</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>-6.36</td>
<td>-3.97</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.634)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(1.18)</td>
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<td>Overid: χ²(1)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p-value)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
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<td>-0.176</td>
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<td>-0.132</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
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<td>(0.06)</td>
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Notes: The table reports OLS, IV, and 2SLS estimates of the effects of a third birth on labor supply using twins and sex composition instruments. Data are from the Angrist and Evans (1998) extract from the 1980 U.S. census 5 percent sample, including women aged 21–35 with at least two children. OLS models include controls for mother’s age, age at first birth, ages of the first two children, and dummies for race. The sample size is 394,840.