Econometrica - July 1994 - Volume 62, Issue 4

Stationary Markov Equilibria
p. 745-781
A. Mas-Colell, A. McLennan, D. Duffie, J. Geanakoplos
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Announcements
p. 965-972
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The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium
p. 783-794
Lawrence E. Blume, William R. Zame
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News Notes
p. 973
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A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
p. 795-817
Motty Perry, Philip J. Reny
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Program of the 1994 Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society
p. 975-993
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On the Measurement of Polarization
p. 819-851
Debraj Ray, Joan-Maria Esteban
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Program of the 1994 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society
p. 994-995
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Infinite Horizon Incomplete Markets
p. 853-880
Martine Quinzii, Michael Magill
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The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information
p. 881-900
Nicholas C. Yannelis, Stefan Krasa
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Volatility and Links between National Stock Markets
p. 901-933
Enrique Sentana, Mervyn King, Sushil Wadhwani
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Notes and Comments: On the Interpretation of Sarin and Wakker's "A Simple Axiomatization of Nonadditive Expected Utility"
p. 935-938
Klaus Nehring
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Notes and Comments: The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
p. 939-948
Dilip Abreu, Lones Smith, Prajit K. Dutta
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Back Matter
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Notes and Comments: The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
p. 949-954
Quan Wen
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Front Matter
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Notes and Comments: Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
p. 955-963
David Austen-Smith
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