SUPPLEMENT TO "THE HISTORICAL STATE, LOCAL COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM"
(*Econometrica*, Vol. 86, No. 6, November 2018, 2083–2121)

MELISSA DELL
Department of Economics, Harvard University and NBER

NATHAN LANE
Department of Economics, Monash University and Department of Economics,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

PABLO QUERUBIN
Department of Politics, New York University

## APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS

FIGURE A-1.—Placebo test using rivers. Notes: The red line shows the 1698 boundary of Dai Viet's administrative expansion and the thick blue lines show rivers that form part of this boundary. Thin blue lines show all rivers.

Melissa Dell: melissadell@fas.harvard.edu
Nathan Lane: nathaniel.lane@monash.edu
Pablo Querubin: pablo.querubin@nyu.edu

(a) *Economic Index and Civil Society Index*

(b) *Local Admin Index and Civil Society Index*

(c) *Education Index and Civil Society Index*

(d) *Health Care Index and Civil Society Index*

FIGURE A-2.—Correlation plots. Notes: Each point is an outcome averaged within a bin. The regression line is fit on the raw data.

TABLE A-I

RANDOMIZATION INFERENCE[a]

Variable	p-value	Variable	p-value
Household Consumption	0.000	Health Workers Visit Regularly	0.000
Years Schooling (>25)	0.000	Health Station in Village	0.013
Telegraph Density 1878	0.005	Maternity Clinic in Village	0.770
Telegraph Density 1901	0.026	Education LCA	0.068
Rail/Road Density 1878	0.441	Primary School Access	0.012
Motor Road Density 1910	0.043	Primary School Completion	0.028
Rail Density 1910	0.023	Secondary School in Village	0.180
Paved Road 1926	0.005	Secondary School Attendance	0.034
Rail Density 1926	0.246	Law Enforced Day/Night	0.000
Log Family Income	0.000	Police Regularly Present	0.000
Economic LCA	0.000	Government Provides Assistance	0.000
Non-Rice Food Available	0.000	Share Communes with Lower Secondary	0.009
Manufactured Goods Available	0.000	Government Responsive to Citizens	0.034
Surplus Goods Produced	0.002	Local Officials Successful	0.000
Households Require Assistance	0.006	Knows Village Administrative Structure	0.052
% Households Access Vehicle	0.000	LTT Fairly Administered	0.000
Land Unfarmed Due to Bad Security	0.878	National Govt. Performs Poorly	0.002
Population Growth	0.680	National Govt. Manages Economy Poorly	0.002
Civil Society LCA	0.000	Active in Interest Group	0.000
% Households Participate in Civic Orgs.	0.000	People Decide SDP	0.007
% Households Participate in Econ. Train.	0.000	Security LCA	0.876
% Households Active in PSDF	0.001	VC Forces Present	0.032
Self-Development Project Underway	0.000	VC Base Nearby	0.541
Council Convenes Meetings	0.704	Village Guerrilla Squad	0.292
Organized Youth Activities	0.457	VC Main Squad	0.092
% Households Attend Govt. Meetings	0.000	VC Infrastructure Activity	0.338
RD Cadre in Hamlet	0.704	VC Taxation	0.715
% Households Participate in RD Cadre	0.000	Friendly Forces Nearby	0.610
Civic Orgs. Provide Assistance	0.000	Air/Art. Strike Nearby	0.371
Contributes to Charity	0.000	U.S. Initiated Attack	0.513
Local Administration LCA	0.060	SVN Initiated Attack	0.000
Govt. Systematically Collects Taxes	0.230	Territorial Forces Present	0.473
Village Committee Filled	0.174	Agricultural Households	0.000
Village Chief Present	0.057	Agricultural Land Size	0.730
Hamlet Chief Present	0.115	Main Job in Industry	0.037
Chief Controls RD Cadre	0.017	Share Annual Land Certified	0.000
Lack Provincial Assistance	0.804	Share Perennial Land Certified	0.000
Technical Personnel Visit	0.955	Share Residential Land Certified	0.000
Provincial Land Affairs Visits	0.987	Household has Interest Expenses	0.000
Health Care LCA	0.000	Employed Informal Sector	0.000
Govt. Medical Services Available	0.000		

[a]The p-values give the share of 1000 absolute placebo coefficients that are larger in magnitude than the absolute coefficient for the actual effect of being on the Dai Viet side of the boundary on the outcome under consideration.

TABLE A-II

HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION: PLACEBO BOUNDARIES[a]

	Sample is:		
	Placebo Boundaries		
	River	Province	Expansion
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dai Viet	−0.090	0.092	−0.044
	(0.097)	(0.109)	(0.064)
Obs	1603	1534	5351
Clusters	165	160	400

[a]The unit of analysis is the household. All columns include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, household demographic controls, year fixed effects, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by village.

TABLE A-III

HUMAN CAPITAL: NO HCM[a]

	Dependent variable is:			
	Years Schooling Cohort			
	>25	25–40	40–60	>60
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dai Viet	0.970	0.886	1.045	1.045
	(0.201)	(0.195)	(0.244)	(0.240)
Obs	33,001	14,186	13,353	5462
Clusters	365	364	365	354
Mean	7.28	8.26	7.50	4.16

[a]The unit of analysis is the individual. All outcomes measured between 2002 and 2012. All columns include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, boundary segment fixed effects, and survey year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

TABLE A-IV

ECONOMIC OUTCOMES SOUTH VIETNAMESE PERIOD: CONTROLLING FOR POPULATION[a]

	Dependent variable is:								
	Log Family Income (1)	Econ. LCA (2)	Non-rice Food Avail. (3)	Manuf. Goods Avail. (4)	Surplus Goods Produced (5)	Households Require Assist. (6)	% HH Access Vehic. (7)	Land Unfarmed Bad Sec. (8)	Pop Growth (9)
Dai Viet	0.218	0.144	0.250	0.156	0.152	−0.058	0.129	0.018	−0.005
	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.019)	(0.047)	(0.006)
Obs	18,273	2348	388	388	388	2330	2332	330	2276
Clusters	220	399	388	388	388	397	396	330	396
Mean	9.93	0.83	0.71	0.63	0.44	0.61	0.34	0.26	0.01

[a]The unit of analysis is the household (column (1)), hamlet (columns (2), (6), (7), and (9)), or village (columns (3)–(5) and (8)). Outcomes measured between 1970–1972 (column (1)) and 1969–1973 (columns (2)–(9)). All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

TABLE A-V

ECONOMIC OUTCOMES SOUTH VIETNAMESE PERIOD: NO HO CHI MINH CITY[a]

	Dependent variable is:								
	Log Family Income (1)	Econ. LCA (2)	Non-rice Food Avail. (3)	Manuf. Goods Avail. (4)	Surplus Goods Produced (5)	Households Require Assist. (6)	% HH Access Vehic. (7)	Land Unfarmed Bad Sec. (8)	Pop Growth (9)
Dai Viet	0.176	0.135	0.256	0.159	0.171	−0.132	0.118	0.009	−0.000
	(0.039)	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.052)	(0.039)	(0.019)	(0.047)	(0.006)
Obs	8491	1568	327	327	327	1551	1553	324	1532
Clusters	168	338	327	327	327	336	335	324	338
Mean	9.78	0.75	0.66	0.57	0.41	0.56	0.26	0.26	0.01

[a]The unit of analysis is the household (column (1)), hamlet (columns (2), (6), (7), and (9)), or village (columns (3)–(5) and (8)). Outcomes measured between 1970–1972 (column (1)) and 1969–1973 (columns (2)–(9)). All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

TABLE A-VI

CIVIL SOCIETY: CONTROLLING FOR POPULATION[a]

	Civil Society	% Households Participate in										
	LCA	Civic Org.	Econ. Train.	% HH Active in PSDF	Self-Dev. Project Underway	Org. Youth Activ.	Council Convenes Meetings	% HH Attend Govt. Mtgs.	RD Cadre in Hamlet	% HH Part. RD Cadre	Civ. Soc. Provides Assist.	Contrib. to Charity Fund
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Dai Viet	0.190	0.262	0.220	0.067	0.097	−0.053	−0.011	0.106	0.021	0.174	0.162	0.153
	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.037)
Obs	2348	2325	2348	2330	388	388	384	2331	2337	2314	2206	5889
Clusters	399	397	399	397	388	388	384	397	397	396	388	450
Mean	0.79	0.37	0.22	0.62	0.83	0.78	0.93	0.37	0.76	0.52	0.24	0.65

[a]The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns (1)–(4) and (8)–(11)), the village (columns (5)–(7)) or the household (column (12)). Outcomes measured between 1969–1973 (columns (1)–(11)) or 2002–2012 (column (12)). All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

TABLE A-VII

CIVIL SOCIETY: NO HO CHI MINH CITY[a]

	Civil Society	% Households Participate in		% HH Active in PSDF	Self-Dev. Project Underway	Org. Youth Activ.	Council Convenes Meetings	% HH Attend Govt. Mtgs.	RD Cadre in Hamlet	% HH Part. RD Cadre	Civ. Soc. Provides Assist.	Contrib. to Charity Fund
	LCA	Civic Org.	Econ. Train.									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Dai Viet	0.153	0.224	0.198	0.037	0.090	−0.069	−0.006	0.075	−0.026	0.129	0.145	0.157
	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.037)
Obs	1568	1546	1568	1551	327	327	323	1552	1558	1535	1467	4689
Clusters	338	336	338	336	327	327	323	336	336	335	331	362
Mean	0.72	0.26	0.19	0.58	0.82	0.74	0.93	0.30	0.69	0.43	0.18	0.62

[a]The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns (1)–(4) and (8)–(11)), the village (columns (5)–(7)) or the household (column (12)). Outcomes measured between 1969–1973 (columns (1)–(11)) or 2002–2012 (column (12)). All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

TABLE A-VIII

LOCAL ADMINISTRATION: CONTROLLING FOR POPULATION[a]

							Provincial Placebos		
	Local Admin. LCA (1)	Govt. Syst. Taxes (2)	Vilg. Comm. Filled (3)	Vilg. Chief	Hamlet Chief	Chief Controls RD Cadre (6)	Lack Prov. Tech. Assist. (7)	Tech. Pers. Visit (8)	Prov. Land Affairs Visit (9)
				Present					
				(4)	(5)				
Dai Viet	0.027	0.058	0.057	0.053	0.024	0.084	0.010	−0.008	−0.002
	(0.013)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.048)	(0.055)
Obs	2348	388	388	388	2317	382	387	386	308
Clusters	399	388	388	388	396	382	387	386	308
Mean	0.98	0.84	0.87	0.93	0.92	0.88	0.18	0.53	0.72

[a]The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns (1) and (5)) or the village (columns (2)–(4) and (6)–(9)). All outcomes measured between 1969 and 1973. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

TABLE A-IX

LOCAL ADMINISTRATION: NO HO CHI MINH CITY[a]

							Provincial Placebos		
	Local Admin. LCA (1)	Govt. Syst. Taxes (2)	Vilg. Comm. Filled (3)	Vilg. Chief	Hamlet Chief	Chief Controls RD Cadre (6)	Lack Prov. Tech. Assist. (7)	Tech. Pers. Visit (8)	Prov. Land Affairs Visit (9)
				Present					
				(4)	(5)				
Dai Viet	0.026	0.075	0.052	0.056	0.021	0.075	−0.008	−0.020	0.008
	(0.012)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.046)	(0.056)
Obs	1568	327	327	327	1538	321	329	327	304
Clusters	338	327	327	327	335	321	329	327	304
Mean	0.97	0.85	0.84	0.92	0.88	0.87	0.17	0.52	0.73

[a]The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns (1) and (5)) or the village (columns (2)–(4) and (6)–(9)). All outcomes measured between 1969 and 1973. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

TABLE A-X

PUBLIC GOODS: CONTROLLING FOR POPULATION[a]

	Health Care	Govt. Med. Serv.	Health Wkrs. Visit	Health Mat. Clinic in Village		Educ.	Primary School		Secondary School		Police Reg.	Law Enforced	Govt. Provides	Share Communes
		Avail.	Reg.			LCA	Access.	Completion	In Vilg.	Attend.	Present	Day/Night	Assist.	Lower Sec.
	LCA													
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Dai Viet	0.113	0.157	0.319	0.129	−0.010	0.031	0.048	0.076	0.034	0.022	0.131	0.201	0.143	0.292
	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.066)	(0.041)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.053)	(0.013)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.069)
Obs	2348	2339	2336	388	388	2348	2336	388	388	388	2339	2333	2221	124
Clusters	399	397	397	388	388	399	396	388	388	388	397	397	390	124
Mean	0.88	0.39	0.47	0.79	0.61	0.84	0.90	0.61	0.35	0.18	0.56	0.79	0.30	0.78

[a]The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns (1)–(3), (6)–(7), and (11)–(13)), the village (columns (4)–(5) and (8)–(10)) or the district (column (14)). Outcomes measured between 1969–1973 (columns (1)–(13)) or 1999–2004 (column (14)). All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village (columns (1)–(13)) or district (column (14)) level, are reported in parentheses.

TABLE A-XI

PUBLIC GOODS: NO HO CHI MINH CITY[a]

	Health Care	Govt. Med. Serv.	Health Wkrs. Visit	Health	Mat.	Educ.	Primary School		Secondary School		Police Reg.	Law Enforced	Govt. Provides	Share Communes
				Clinic in Village									
	LCA	Avail.	Reg.			LCA	Access.	Completion	In Vilg.	Attend.	Present	Day/Night	Assist.	Lower Sec.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Dai Viet	0.099	0.199	0.313	0.136	0.006	0.015	0.070	0.084	0.053	0.021	0.085	0.175	0.123	0.310
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.069)	(0.041)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.013)	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.076)
Obs	1568	1560	1557	327	327	1568	1557	327	327	327	1560	1554	1482	112
Clusters	338	336	336	327	327	338	335	327	327	327	336	336	333	112
Mean	0.83	0.35	0.40	0.77	0.56	0.78	0.90	0.59	0.28	0.17	0.36	0.69	0.30	0.79

[a]The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns (1)–(3), (6)–(7), and (11)–(13)), the village (columns (4)–(5) and (8)–(10)) or the district (column (14)). Outcomes measured between 1969–1973 (columns (1)–(13)) or 199-9-2004 (column (14)). All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village (columns (1)–(13)) or district (column (14)) level, are reported in parentheses.

TABLE A-XII

PUBLIC OPINION: CONTROLLING FOR POPULATION[a]

	Dependent variable is:							
	Views of Local Gov.				Views of National Gov.		Civic Engagement	
	Gvt.	Local	Knows Vilg.	LTT	Natl. Gvt.		Active in	People
	Responsive	Officials	Admin.	Fairly	Performs	Man. Econ.	Interest	Decide
	Citizens	Successful	Struct. Well	Administ.	Poorly	Poorly	Group	SDP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dai Viet	0.113	0.154	0.073	0.317	0.092	0.081	0.338	0.208
	(0.045)	(0.074)	(0.056)	(0.080)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.146)	(0.055)
Obs	2779	3487	1457	999	2811	5778	243	353
Clusters	190	183	89	101	182	215	35	53
Mean	0.37	0.52	0.22	0.57	0.19	0.31	0.18	0.23

[a]The unit of analysis is the individual. All outcomes measured between 1970 and 1972. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

TABLE A-XIII

PUBLIC OPINION: NO HO CHI MINH CITY[a]

	Dependent variable is:							
	Views of Local Gov.				Views of National Gov.		Civic Engagement	
	Gvt.	Local	Knows Vilg.	LTT	Natl. Gvt.		Active in	People
	Responsive	Officials	Admin.	Fairly	Performs	Man. Econ.	Interest	Decide
	Citizens	Successful	Struct. Well	Administ.	Poorly	Poorly	Group	SDP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dai Viet	0.110	0.170	0.096	0.350	0.093	0.117	0.395	0.222
	(0.041)	(0.077)	(0.046)	(0.075)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.146)	(0.052)
Obs	1590	1750	335	999	1432	2558	243	353
Clusters	141	132	43	101	131	160	35	53
Mean	0.32	0.45	0.16	0.57	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.23

[a]The unit of analysis is the individual. All outcomes measured between 1970 and 1972. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

TABLE A-XIV

THE VIETNAM WAR: CONTROLLING FOR POPULATION[a]

						Dependent variable is:				U.S.	SVN	Territ.
	Security LCA	VC Forces Present	VC Base Nearby	Vilg. Guerr. Squad	VC Main Squad	VC Infra Activity	VC Taxation	Friendly Forces Nearby	Air/Art. Strike Nearby	Initiated Attack	Initiated Attack	Forces Present
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Dai Viet	−0.011	-0.033	−0.009	0.073	−0.100	0.035	−0.012	−0.010	−0.037	−0.000	−0.095	−0.020
	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.016)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.002)	(0.023)	(0.027)
Obs	2348	2335	390	390	390	2339	389	389	388	2348	2348	2348
Clusters	399	398	390	390	390	398	389	389	388	399	399	399
Mean	0.83	0.15	0.49	0.20	0.23	0.09	0.07	0.49	0.13	0.00	0.71	0.24

[a]The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns (1)–(2), (6), and (10)–(12)) or the village (columns (3)–(5) and (7)–(9)). Outcomes measured between 1969–1973 (columns (1)–(9)), 1970–1973 (columns (10)–(11)), or 1970–1974 (column (12)). All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

TABLE A-XV

THE VIETNAM WAR: NO HO CHI MINH CITY[a]

	Security LCA	VC Forces Present	VC Base Nearby	Vilg. Guerr. Squad	VC Main Squad	VC Infra Activity	VC Taxation	Friendly Forces Nearby	Air/Art. Strike Nearby	U.S. Initiated Attack	SVN Initiated Attack	Territ. Forces Present
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Dai Viet	−0.016	−0.024	0.009	0.074	−0.096	0.029	−0.011	−0.046	−0.039	−0.000	−0.065	0.032
	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.016)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.001)	(0.018)	(0.023)
Obs	1568	1556	329	329	329	1560	329	329	328	1578	1578	1568
Clusters	338	337	329	329	329	337	329	329	328	339	339	338
Mean	0.76	0.21	0.57	0.24	0.27	0.11	0.08	0.47	0.15	0.00	0.78	0.35

Dependent variable is:

[a]The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns (1)–(2), (6), and (10)–(12)) or the village (columns (3)–(5) and (7)–(9)). Outcomes measured between 1969–1973 (columns (1)–(9)), 1970–1973 (columns (10)–(11)), or 1970–1974 (column (12)). All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

TABLE A-XVI

LAND AND MARKETS: NO HO CHI MINH CITY[a]

	Agric. H.H. (1)	Agric. Land Size (2)	Main Job in Industry (3)	Share			H.H. Interest Expenses (7)	Employed Informal Sector (8)
				Annual	Perennial	Residential		
				Land Certified				
				(4)	(5)	(6)		
Dai Viet	−0.184	−0.010	−0.020	−0.131	−0.149	−0.184	−0.113	−0.070
	(0.035)	(0.111)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.022)
Obs	13,205	4471	16,518	462	449	445	3590	16,504
Clusters	365	270	365	192	190	189	203	365

[a]The unit of analysis is the household (columns (1), (2), and (7)), individual (columns (3) and (8)), or commune (columns (4)–(6)). All outcomes measured between 2002 and 2012. All columns include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, year fixed effects, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

APPENDIX B: DATA APPENDIX

TABLE B-I

DEFINITIONS AND CODINGS (TABLE VI)

Column	Original question	Question responses	Coding
	Categorical HES economic questions		
3	Is a variety of foodstuffs other than rice and nuoc nam (such as pork, vegetables, fresh fruit, fish, etc) for sale at the local market	0=no; 1=limited quantity; 2=ample quantity	0/1=0; 2=1
4	Are manufactured goods such as bicycle tires, kerosene, and aluminum pots for sale at the local markets	0=no; 1=limited quantity; 2=ample quantity	0/1=0; 2=1
5	Is there a surplus of goods or foodstuffs produced in this village for sale outside the village	0=no; 1=yes, small; 2=yes, large	0/1=0; 2=1
6	Are there households in this hamlet who require assistance from others to maintain themselves at a subsistence level (friends, relatives, government, etc)	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=41-90%; 4=all or nearly all	0=0; 1/2/3/4=1
7	Do any households in this hamlet have access to motorized vehicles	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=>40%	midpoints of intervals, top interval coded at 0.5 (robust to alternative top codings)
8	Is there farm land which belongs to this village which is not presently cultivated	0=no; 1=yes, primarily because of bad security; 2=yes, primarily for reasons other than security	0/2=0; 1=1
	Other variables (not included in LCA)		
1	How much is the average monthly family income?	12 income bins	continuous variable coded at midpoints of ranges, top interval coded at 100,000
9	total hamlet population	Integer count	We compute quarterly hamlet population growth

Source for variable in column 1 is PAAS - National Archives Record Groups 330 and 472
Source for variables in columns 3-9 is Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) - National Archives Record Group 472

TABLE B-II

DEFINITIONS AND CODINGS (TABLE VII)

Column	Original question	Question responses	Coding
	HES categorical civil society questions		
2	Do any households have a member(s) participating in non-VC civic or religious organizations (farmers associations, co-ops; boy scouts, etc)	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=41-90%; 4=all or nearly all	A continuous variable coded using the midpoints of the intervals
3	Did any hamlet households have member(s) participating in government sponsored economic improvement programs (ag, animal husbandry, fisheries, handicraft, etc) during the past quarter	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=41-90%; 4=all or nearly all	A continuous variable coded using the midpoints of the intervals
4	Do any households have a member(s) active in the PSDF	0=none; 1=<10%; 2=10%-40%; 3=41%-90%; 4=all or nearly all	A continuous variable coded using the midpoints of the intervals
5	Are self-development projects physically underway	0=no; 1=yes but none were selected at open public meetings; 2=yes, some were selected at open public meetings; 3=yes all were selected at open public meetings	0=0; 1/2/3=1
6	Are there any organized activities for the youth of this village	0=no; 1=yes	0=0; 1=1
7	How frequently does the village council convene open public meetings to discuss village development plans and projects, local grievances, aspirations, etc.	0=never; 1=< once per month; 2=once a month on average; 3=twice a month or more	0/1=0; 2/3=1
	Variables available only in a selected sample (not in LCA)		
8	Did any hamlet households have a member or members attending any GVN-sponsored public meetings, award ceremonies, etc in the hamlet or village during the past quarter?	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=41-90%; 4=all or nearly all	A continuous variable coded using the midpoints of the intervals
10	Do any of the hamlet households have a member participating in "people's groups" organized by members of an RD Cadre Team?	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=41-90%; 4=all or nearly all	A continuous variable coded using the midpoints of the intervals
11	Has any welfare assistance been provided by non-GVN voluntary agencies to needy or refugee households in this hamlet during the past quarter?	0=no, none needed; 1=no; 2=yes	0/1=0; 2=1
	Not determined by local civil society (not in LCA)		
9	Have RD Cadre worked in this hamlet during the past quarter?	0=no; 1=yes, but no cadre currently working; 2=yes, cadre currently working	0=0; 1/2=1
	Variables from VHLSS		
12	Has the household made contributions to various funds (natural disaster funds, charity funds,poverty funds, study encouragement funds ....)	0=no; 1=yes	0=0; 1=1
	Variables not reported in main text		
	Did any hamlet household(s) have members who participated in self-development projects during the quarter	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=41-90%; 4=all or nearly all	

Source for variables in columns 2-11 is Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) - National Archives Record Group 472; source for variable in column 12 is Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS)

TABLE B-III

DEFINITIONS AND CODINGS (TABLE VIII)

Column	Original question	Question responses	Coding
	HES categorical local administration questions		
2	Does the GVN collect taxes in this village?	0=no; 1=no, tax amnesty granted; 2=yes, but unsystematically or sporadically; 3=yes, systematically	0/1/2=0; 3=1
3	Is there an active government village administrative committee	0=no; 1=yes, consists of village chief only; 2=yes but two or more positions vacant; 3=yes but one position vacant; 4=all positions filled	0/1/2/3=0; 4=1
4	Is the GVN village chief regularly present in this village?	0=no; 1=no, irregularly; 2=yes but only by day; 3=yes, day and night	0/1/2=0; 3=1
5	Is the GVN hamlet chief regularly present in this hamlet	0=no; 1=no, irregularly; 2=yes but only by day; 3=yes, day and night	0/1/2=0; 3=1
	Variables available only in a selected sample (not in LCA)		
6	Does the village chief have operational control over RD Cadre personnel working in this village?	0=no, no RD Cadre; 1=no, no control; 2=yes, partial; 3=yes, complete	1/2=0; 3=1
	Policies under the control of provincial governments (not included in LCA)		
7	Have any self-development projects in this village been retarded because of absence of technical assistance from province or district level personnel?	0=no such projects; 1=no, no retardation; 2=yes, minor retardation; 3=yes, serious retardation; 4=yes, resulting in project abandonment	0/1=0; 2/3/4=1
8	Do GVN technical personnel visit this village in support of local development programs? E.g. agriculture technicians, animal husbandry specialists, fisheries specialists, etc.	0=no; 1=yes, but infrequently (less than once a month); 2=yes, periodically (1-3 times a month); 3=yes, regularly (once a week or more); 4=yes, resident in village	0/1=0; 2/3/4=1
9	Have officials in the Province Land Affairs Service visited this village to assist in implementing the Land to the Tiller program during the quarter?	0=no; 1=yes, once; 2=yes, 2 to 4 times; 3=yes, more than 4 times	0/1=0; 2/3=1
	Variables Not Reported in Main Text		
	How often does the village chief visit this hamlet	0=never; 1=less than once a month; 2=1-4 times per month; 3=twice a week or more; 4=resident in the hamlet	
	Is there a functioning government village office located in this village where official business is regularly conducted or where village administrative records are maintained	0=no;1=yes	

Source for all variables is Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) - National Archives Record Group 472

TABLE B-IV
DEFINITIONS AND CODINGS (TABLE IX)

Column	Original question	Question responses	Coding
	Categorical HES health care questions		
2	Are government sponsored medical services available to hamlet residents	0=none accessible; 1=yes but further than a nearby hamlet; 2=yes, in a nearby hamlet; 3=yes in this hamlet	0/1/2=0; 3=1
3	Do government health workers visit this hamlet	0=no; 1=< once per month; 2=1-3 times per month; 3=once a week or more; 4=resident in hamlet	0/1/2=0; 3/4=1
4	Is a government sponsored public health station (dispensary) accessible to residents of this village	0=none accessible; 1=yes but further than an adjacent village; 2=yes, in the adjacent village; 3=yes in the village	0/1/2=0; 3=1
5	Is a government sponsored maternity clinic accessible to the residents of this village	0=none accessible; 1=yes but further than an adjacent village; 2=yes, in the adjacent village; 3=yes in the village	0/1/2=0; 3=1
	Categorical HES education questions		
7	Are the children of hamlet residents able to attend primary school classes (grades 1-5)?	0=no; 1=yes, but school located further than nearby hamlet; 2=yes, school located in nearby hamlet; 3=yes, school located in this hamlet	0/1=0; 2/3=1
8	Do any of the children of this village complete the five year primary education program	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=41-90%; 4=all or nearly all	A continuous variable coded using the midpoints of the intervals
9	Is a GVN-accredited secondary school (grades 6-12) accessible?	0=no; 1=yes, but further than adjacent village; 2=yes, in adjacent village; 3=yes, in this village	0/1/2=0; 3=1
10	Do any of the children of village residents attend secondary school	0=no; 1=<5%; 2=5-20%; 3=>20%	A continuous variable coded using the midpoints of the intervals
	Other public goods in HES		
11	How often are police or NPFF present in the hamlet?	0=never; 1= less than once a month; 2=1-3 times a month; 3=once a week or more; 4=regularly present by day; 5=regularly present, night and day	0/1/2/3/4=0; 5=1
12	During daylight hours, do GVN authorities enforce the laws in this hamlet?/During hours of darkness, do GVN authorities enforce the laws in this hamlet?	0=no; 1=yes, but marginal; 2=yes, adequate	2/2=1; otherwise=0
13	Has any welfare assistance been provided by GVN sources to needy households in this hamlet (excluding assistance provided to GVN-recognized refugees) during the past quarter?	0=no, none needed; 1=no; 2=yes	0/1=0; 2=1
	Variables from provincial yearbooks		
14	Share of communes in district with a secondary school	Continuous variable between 0 and 1	
	Variables not reported in main text		
	Is attendance at primary school restricted by lack of teachers?	0=no; 1=yes	
	Is attendance at primary school restricted by the absence or over-crowding of nearby facilities	0=no; 1=yes	
	Is attendance at primary classes restricted because of security conditions?	0=no; 1=yes	

Source for variables in columns 1-13 is Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) - National Archives Record Group 472; source for variable in column 14 are provincial yearbooks for the 1999-2004 period.

TABLE B-V

DEFINITIONS AND CODINGS (TABLE X)

Column	Original question	Question responses	Coding
1	How Responsive in Respondent's Opinion is the Government to an Individual's Problems/Necessary Paperwork	A=very responsive, problems are attended to immediately; B=very responsive under certain conditions; C=somewhat responsive under certain conditions; D=unresponsive, there are usually long delays; E=very unresponsive, interminable delays, unneccessary red tape, etc	C/D/E=0; A/B=1
2	What do the People of the Community Think of the Performance of Local Officials in their Role of Insuring Security?	A=actively work with the people and armed forced to keep the vc out with good success; B=strive to improve the security situation in the community, but not enitrely successful; C=have some degree of success in improving security situation; D=have little or no success in improving the security situation	B/C/D=0; A=1
3	How Well Does the Respondent Know the Village Administrative Organizational Structure?	A=knows it well; B=has some knowledge; C=has little knowledge	B/C=0; A=1
4	Do You Believe the Land to the Tiller Program is Being Administered Fairly in Your Village?	A=yes, very fairly; B=yes, usually fairly; C=no, somewhat unfairly; D=no, very unfairly	C/D=0; A/B=1
5	What do the People of the Community Think About the Performance of the National Government?	A=the gov't has performed as well as could be expected under the circumstances; B=with a few exceptions gov't has performed as well as could be expected given the circumstances; C=gov't has performed adequately; D=with a few exceptions, the gov't performance has been inadequate; E=gov't incapable of performing	A/B/C=0; D/E=1
6	How Does the Respondent Rate GVN Performance in Handling Economic Problems?	A=very poor, has aggravated problems of people; B=poor, has done nothing to solve problems; C=has strived to solve economic problems with some success; D=has strived to solve economic problems with great success	B/C/D=0; A=1
7	If the Respondent has or is Participating in a Self Dev Project, was or is the Respondent a Member of a Special Interest Group?	A=involved in self dev, member of group that is very active; B=involved in self dev, member of group ocassionally active; C=involved in self dev, member of group that is inactive; D=not involved in self dev but knows of people who are involved and are group members; E=not involved in self dev, not a group member and knows nothing of special interest groups	C/D/E=0; A/B=1
8	Who Decides What Self Development Projects will be Approved?	A=district chief; B=village chief; C=village council or management board; D=hamlet chief; E=RD Cadre; F=religious leaders; G=people of the hamlet; H=american advisors	A/B/C/D/E/F/H=0; G=1

Source for variables is PAAS - National Archives Record Groups 330 and 472

TABLE B-VI

DEFINITIONS AND CODINGS (TABLE XI)

Column	Original question	Question responses	Coding	Notes
		HES categorical variables on insurgency		
2	Were armed enemy military forces present in inhabited parts of the hamlet during the month	0=no; 1=yes once; 2=yes, sporadically; 3=yes frequently	0=0; 1/2/3=1	
3	Are there areas in or adjacent to this village which enemy forces use as assembly areas for operations against friendly activities in the general area	0=no; 1=yes, temporary havens; 2=yes, small base areas; 3=yes, major base areas	0=0; 1/2/3=1	
4	What is the estimated size of the largest village guerrilla unit regularly present in this village (do not include local or main force units)	0=none; 1=less than a squad; 2=about a squad; 3=about a platoon; 4=more than a platoon	0/1=0; 2/3/4=1	A squad consists of at least two individuals
5	What is the estimated size of the largest enemy main or local force unit regularly present in this village or adjacent villages	0=none; 1=less than a squad; 2=about a squad; 3=about a platoon; 4=more than a platoon	0/1=0; 2/3/4=1	
6	Which of the following most closely reflects the activity of the VC Infrastructure	0=no known or suspected infrastructure; 1=sporadic covert activity, little or no overt activity; 2=regular covert activity, sporadic overt activity; 3=regular overt activity but not firmly established; 4=unchallenged authority in the village	0/1=0; 2/3/4=1	
7	During this month, was the main surface route leading from this village to the province capital open during daylight hours	0=no; 1=yes but regular enemy harassment or taxation; 2=yes, sporadic enemy harassment or taxation; 3=yes, no enemy harassment or taxation	3=0; 0/1/2=1	
		Questions on U.S. and South Vietnamese Interventions		
8	Have friendly external forces operated in this village during the month?	0=no; 1=yes, no enemy contact; 2=yes, light contact with enemy; 3=yes, heavy contact with enemy	0=0; 1/2/3=1	
9	Were any friendly artillery fires or air strikes directed in or near the inhabited area of this village during the month?	0=no; 1=yes, once; 2=yes, sporadically; 3=yes, repeatedly	0=0; 1/2/3=1	
10	U.S. initiated attack indicator	The data record the coordinates and dates of all U.S. initiated attacks, undertaken by both small and large		
11	SVN initiated attack indicator	The data record the coordinates and dates of all SVN initiated attacks, undertaken by both small and large		
12	Regional Forces Indicator	Indicator for whether there was presence of regional forces in the hamlet in the month.		
		Variables not reported in main text		
	Did the enemy initiate action against local security forces in or near the hamlet during the past month	0=no; 1=yes once; 2=yes, sporadically; 3=yes frequently		
	Were any attempts at selective terrorism (kidnapping, assassination) directed at particular government officials, prominent residents, or local leaders of the hamlet during the month	0=no; 1=yes once; 2=yes, more than once		
	Were any acts of non-selective terrorism (mining, sabotage, harassing fire, bombing of a public place) directed against people of this hamlet	0=no; 1=yes once; 2=yes, more than once		
	Have incidents targeted against government non-military activities (projects, offices, police) occurred in this hamlet	0=no; 1=yes, minor; 2=yes, serious		
	Do any households have a member or members who participated, by coercion or otherwise, in enemy-organized non-military group activities	0=none; 1=<10%; 2=10%-40%; 3=41%-90%; 4=all or nearly all		
	Were any enemy propaganda meetings held or was printed propaganda distributed in this hamlet	0=no; 1=yes once; 2=yes, more than once		
	What was the estimated size of the largest enemy local or main force unit present in or near inhabited areas in this village during the month	0=none; 1=less than a platoon; 2= about a platoon; 3=about a company; 4=a battalion or more		
	What was the most serious level of enemy-initiated military activity directed at local security forces	0=none; 1=minor harassment (sniping, mining, etc); 2=attack by coordinated small arms or automatic weapons fire; 3=attack by heavy weapons fire (mortar, rocket, rr, etc.); 4=ground assault, repelled; 5=ground assault, friendly position overrun		
	Which of the following most closely reflects the status of the enemy infrastructure	0=no known or suspected infrastructure; 1=sporadic covert activity, little or no overt activity; 2=regular covert activity, sporadic overt activity mostly at night; 3=the primary authority in the hamlet at night but most act covertly during the day; 4=the primary authority present day and night		
	Do enemy forces tax goods and produce moving to or from this village	0=no; 1=yes, sporadically; 2=yes, regularly		
	Does the enemy collect taxes from hamlet households	0=no; 1=yes sporadically; 2=yes regularly and systematically		
	Do any hamlet households have a member(s) in enemy service	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=41-90%; 4=all or nearly all		
	During daylight hours, do government authorities enforce the laws	0=no; 1=yes but marginal; 2=yes adequate		
	During nighttime hours, do government authorities enforce the laws	0=no; 1=yes but marginal; 2=yes adequate		
	Civilian casualties caused by enemy military activities	0=no; 1=yes, none killed; 2=yes 0-5 killed; 3=yes, >5 killed		
	Property damage caused by enemy military activities	0=no; 1=yes minor, 1=yes serious but localized 3=yes widespread		

Source for variables in columns 2-9 is Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) - National Archives Record Group 472
Source for variables in columns 10-11 is Situation Report Army (SITRA) - National Archives Record Group 218
Source for variable in column 12 is Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) and the Territorial Forces Activity Reporting System (TFARS) - National Archives Record Groups 472 and 330, respectively.

APPENDIX C: COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF HES QUESTIONS

THIS APPENDIX EXAMINES questions contained in the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) that fall outside the main scope of the study. There are three reasons why we do not examine questions in the main text: (1) For many variables, we have no clear theoretical predictions about how the historical state would affect them. Hence they do little to elucidate the hypotheses that we are testing and are also not good candidates for placebo outcomes. (2) Some questions are only answered by hamlets meeting certain criteria—which may themselves be affected by treatment—complicating the interpretation of the coefficients. For example, a village would answer a question about how self-development projects were progressing only if some projects were underway. (3) Some questions were only collected for part of the sample period. Questions were removed if challenges to their interpretation came to light. Moreover, if the set of questions changes over time, the inputs to the latent class index also change, making the average of this index across the sample period more difficult to interpret. For completeness, Tables C-I–C-VI examine all these outcomes, and the Online Supplemental Material lists the question text and coding. The conclusions that emerge are highly consistent with those in the main text.

TABLE C-I

FRIENDLY SECURITY[a]

Panel A	Dependent variable is:								
	Friendly Security LCA (1)	Local Security Misconduct (2)	External Force Misconduct (3)	Local Sec. Contacted Enemy (4)	PSDF Engages Enemy (5)	Friendly External Forces (6)	Friendly Air Strikes (7)	Friendly Civilian Cas. (8)	Friendly Property Damage (9)
Dai Viet	0.143	0.008	0.015	0.014	0.010	−0.024	−0.040	−0.006	0.004
	(0.056)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Obs	2348	2326	2333	2326	2301	389	388	2331	2331
Clusters	399	398	398	398	397	389	388	398	398
Mean	0.44	0.03	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.49	0.13	0.01	0.01

Panel B	Dependent variable is:								
	Friendly Force Defeat (10)	PF/RF Primarily Responsible (11)	GVN No Go Darkness (12)	GVN No Go Daylight (13)	Military Base Nearby (14)	Daylight Reaction Time (15)	Darkness Reaction Time (16)	Reasonable Fire Support (17)	Village Security Plan (18)
Dai Viet	−0.011	−0.259	−0.019	−0.011	0.202	−0.008	−0.016	−0.009	0.103
	(0.011)	(0.053)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.048)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.008)	(0.040)
Obs	2341	2339	2337	2329	390	389	389	389	388
Clusters	398	397	397	397	390	389	389	389	388
Mean	0.03	0.52	0.05	0.02	0.46	0.95	0.89	0.98	0.74

Panel C	Dependent variable is:								
	NP Enforces Law (19)	NP Reg. Present Hamlet (20)	Inhabited Curfew 9:30 (21)	Surrounding Curfew 9:30 (22)	Road Curfew 9:30 (23)	NP Reg. Present Village (24)	NP Procedures Up to Date (25)	HH Member in Gvt Service (26)	Non-comm Political Parties (27)
Dai Viet	0.012	0.146	−0.052	0.040	0.015	0.023	0.049	0.099	0.197
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.061)	(0.072)	(0.054)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.035)
Obs	2338	2339	2339	2339	389	388	388	2333	388
Clusters	397	397	397	397	389	388	388	397	388
Mean	0.82	0.80	0.31	0.41	0.48	0.97	0.85	0.53	0.54

[a]The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns (1)–(5), (8)–(13), (19)–(22), and (26)) or the village (columns (6)–(7), (14)–(18), (23)–(25), and (27)). Outcomes measured between 1969 and 1973. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

Additional Modules: Table C-I begins by considering the 26 questions—covering a range of topics—that consider "friendly security"—that is, U.S. security forces, South Vietnamese security forces, and other factors relevant for maintaining security during the Vietnam War. In a few cases, the questions reflect features primarily under local control, and the effects are in the expected direction. For example, Dai Viet villages are more likely to have a village security plan (column (18)), and they are more likely to have household members in government service (column (26)). For most questions, however, we have no clear prior about the direction of the effects. For example, we do not have a theory on how the historical state would affect the time of day that different types of curfews are imposed, and indeed find no effects (columns (21)–(23)). Outcomes like whether or not the village had an air or artillery strike (column (7)), which external security force is primarily responsible for maintaining security (column (11)), reaction times of nearby

TABLE C-II

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND LAND TO TILLER[a]

	Psych Opps LCA (1)	Hamlet Info Cadre (2)	Static Visual Displays (3)	% HH Own TV (4)	Village Info Cadre (5)	Exposure to GVN Movies (6)	Mobile Info Visits (7)	Land Tiller LCA (8)	% HH Land Tenants (9)	% HH Land Owners (10)	% HH Land Squatters (11)	% HH Wage Laborers (12)	LTT Titles Granted (13)
							Dependent variable is:						
Dai Viet	0.177	0.103	0.198	0.105	−0.049	0.057	0.085	0.008	−0.012	0.025	0.002	0.016	−0.096
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.033)
Obs	2348	2313	2336	2330	387	388	388	387	328	330	334	329	326
Clusters	399	393	397	397	387	388	388	387	328	330	334	329	326
Mean	0.36	0.62	0.47	0.22	0.74	0.49	0.41	0.48	0.18	0.53	0.03	0.14	0.48

[a]The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns (1)–(4)) or the village (columns (5)–(13)). Outcomes measured between 1969 and 1973. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

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TABLE C-III

MAIN OUTCOMES: SELECTED[a]

	Dependent variable is:				
	Self Dev Progress Satisfact.	Share Council Elected	Chief Corrects Grievances	Self Dev Material Shortage	School Sanctioned GVN
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dai Viet	−0.000	0.019	0.001	0.147	0.002
	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.041)	(0.028)	(0.005)
Obs	2277	321	385	382	2322
Clusters	391	321	385	382	396
Mean	0.26	0.98	0.75	0.20	0.99

[a]The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns (1) and (5)) or the village (columns (2)–(4)). Outcomes measured between 1969 and 1973. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

forces (columns (15)–(16)), and the amount of fire support that external forces provide to local security forces (column (17)) result from the interaction of external decisions and local security conditions, and hence are a less clear test of differences in local conditions or external decisions than the outcomes examined in the main text. With the exception of the question on the security force primarily responsible for maintaining security, which is more likely to be the Popular/Regional Forces (regional defense forces) in Dai Viet areas, the estimates are not statistically significant.[1] Other outcomes, such as misconduct by security forces (columns (2) and (3)) and casualties/damage caused by friendly security forces (columns (8) and (9)), are interesting but beyond the scope of the hypotheses that we focus on.

Next, Table C-II considers two additional HES modules not examined in the main text: psychological operations (psyops) and Land to Tiller. Psyops aimed to convince South Vietnamese citizens to support the U.S.-backed South Vietnamese government rather than the Viet Cong insurgency. Some pysops programs, such as leaflet drops, were planned centrally using algorithms. Others, such as displaying posters, involved the local government. Dai Viet hamlets are more likely to have trained an information cadre to manage propaganda within the hamlet (column (2)), although there is no impact on whether the village office also has an information cadre (column (5)). They are also more likely to have mobile information cadre visit the village (column (7)), perhaps as a result of having more local guerrilla activity, as seen in the main text. As expected given their higher income levels, Dai Viet households are more likely to own a television (column (4)). They are also more likely to have new static visual displays (posters) posted regularly (column (3)), plausibly as a result of the hamlet information cadre whose job is to maintain such displays.

Columns (8) to (13) of Table C-II examine measures in the Land to Tiller module, which considers the South Vietnamese land reform conducted during the 1960s and 1970s and implemented through cooperation between local and central authorities. There are not statistically or economically significant differences in the share of households that were tenants, landowners, squatters, and wage laborers (columns (9)–(12)). Dai Viet villages

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[1]Alternatives include the National Police Field Force, the Army of South Vietnam, and the U.S. Army.

TABLE C-IV

ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES: SELECTED[a]

	Dependent variable is:											
	Security Checks Daylight	Security Checks Darkness	PSDF Is Active	Chief Controls PF	Enemy Infra. Known	Enemy Guerilla Known	RD Cadre Positive	RD Cadre Cooperate	RD Cad. Sleep in Village	Refugee Allowances Paid	Combat Related Assistance	Chief Controls NP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Dai Viet	0.064	0.025	0.166	−0.086	0.011	0.021	−0.045	0.003	−0.068	0.234	0.033	−0.076
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.036)	(0.111)	(0.075)	(0.044)
Obs	2247	2279	2293	328	381	320	2295	382	382	1072	1200	386
Clusters	393	394	395	328	381	320	396	382	382	186	257	386
Mean	0.92	0.84	0.71	0.61	0.76	0.69	0.95	0.95	0.83	0.60	0.54	0.59

[a]The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns (1)–(3), (7), and (10)–(11)) or the village (columns (4)–(6), (8)–(9), and (12)). Outcomes measured between 1969 and 1973. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

TABLE C-V

MAIN OUTCOMES: PARTIAL SAMPLE PERIOD[a]

	Prices Publicized, Controlled (1)	Skills Training Offered (2)	Village Labor Surplus (3)	Rice Surplus (4)	Non-Rice Surplus (5)	Officials Settle Disputes (6)	Hamlet Represented Council (7)	Projects Affected by Corruption (8)	Vung Tau Training (9)	Budget Funded Locally (10)
						Dependent variable is:				
Dai Viet	−0.021	−0.164	−0.069	0.240	−0.070	0.052	0.024	0.010	0.067	0.136
	(0.042)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.042)	(0.049)
Obs	384	382	384	378	379	2234	1592	373	382	331
Clusters	384	382	384	378	379	386	334	373	382	331
Mean	0.25	0.57	0.36	0.67	0.71	0.97	0.90	0.07	0.60	0.23

[a]The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns (6)–(7)) or the village (columns (1)–(5) and (8)–(10)). Outcomes measured between 1969 and 1973. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

are less likely to grant titles (column (13)), a result that is highly consistent with the more recent effects on titling documented in the main text.

Conditional Questions: Next, we examine questions that are answered only if some other condition holds. Table C-III considers outcomes that speak to the categories of variables that are examined in the main text. While some caution is required in interpretation, to the extent that effects are statistically significant, they tend to go in the expected direction. The share of the village council that is elected—conditional on there being a council—is higher in Dai Viet villages (column (2)). Moreover, self-development projects are more likely to be retarded by material shortages (column (4)). The labor for self-development projects was provided through local organizing but materials were received from higher levels of government. To the extent that Dai Viet villages were better able to organize labor for projects, we would expect them to be more likely to hit a material constraint. There are not significant effects on whether self-development projects are progressing satisfactorily (conditional on being underway), on whether the chief corrects

TABLE C-VI

ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES: PARTIAL SAMPLE PERIOD[a]

	VC Targets Sleep in House (1)	PSDP Performs Well (2)	Local Security Adequate (3)	Local Security Plan (4)	Police Present Day/Night (5)	Police In Uniform (6)	% HH Own Radios (7)	% HH No Title (8)	LTT Land Disputes (9)	Effort Implement LTT (10)
						Dependent variable is:				
Dai Viet	0.064	−0.092	0.012	−0.041	−0.030	0.046	0.063	0.049	−0.015	−0.013
	(0.045)	(0.062)	(0.015)	(0.053)	(0.032)	(0.065)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.031)
Obs	2280	1964	2288	384	384	382	2290	300	305	301
Clusters	392	356	392	384	384	382	392	300	305	301
Mean	0.80	0.79	0.98	0.68	0.91	0.65	0.71	0.18	0.05	0.90

[a]The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns (1)–(3) and (7)) or the village (columns (4)–(6) and (8)–(10)). Outcomes measured between 1969 and 1973. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

grievances raised in village meetings (conditional on those meetings occurring), and on whether the village school is sanctioned by the Vietnamese government (conditional on it existing).

Table C-IV examines the three outcome categories considered in this Appendix: friendly security, psychological operations, and Land to Tiller. Effects that reflect outcomes under local control again tend to go in the expected direction: conditional on a police presence, police in Dai Viet villages are more likely to perform daytime (though not nighttime) security checks (columns (1) and (2)); conditional on existing, the People's Self Defense Force is more likely to be active (column (3)); and allowances are more likely to be paid to refugees if they are present (column (10)). If anything, outcomes in this table also suggest tenser relations between the village chief and various security and external forces, perhaps reflecting the greater local guerrilla presence documented in the main text: the village chief is less likely to control the popular forces (a regional defense force, column (4)) and the national police (a police force operating locally and supported by the South Vietnamese central government, column (12)). The RD cadre (the corps of South Vietnamese development aid workers) are less likely to have a positive impact on the hamlet government (as rated by the hamlet government, column (7)) and are also less likely to sleep in the village (column (9)), possibly reflecting the greater guerrilla presence or hostility towards outsiders more generally. There is no effect on whether the RD cadre cooperate with the local government in executing their duties (column (8)), nor are there effects on whether the identities of the local VC Infrastructure or guerrillas are known to friendly intelligence personnel (columns (5) and (6)).

Questions Asked for Only Part of the Sample Period: Finally, we examine questions that were asked during only part of the sample period (1969–1973). Some were removed when it became apparent that they were not informative, whereas others were added later. To the extent that the questions are less informative, we would expect estimates to be at best noisier. For this reason, and also to ensure that the latent class index contains a consistent set of questions across the sample period, we do not focus on these questions in the main text.

Table C-V considers outcomes that relate to questions examined in the main text. Most estimates are not statistically different from zero; those that are go in the expected direction given the results in the main text. There are not statistically significant effects on whether prices are publicized and controlled (to reduce inflation, column (1)), on whether the hamlet is represented on the village council (most are, column (7)), or on whether self-development projects are impacted by corruption (column (8)). Households are more likely to have a rice surplus (column (4)) but not a non-rice surplus (column (5)) or a village labor surplus (column (3)). There is less likely to be skills training offered (column (2)). Village officials are more likely to settle disputes than traditional authorities or the Viet Cong, as we would expect given the centrality of historical village government (column (6)). There is not a difference in whether village officials are sent to a training center subsidized by the central government (column (9)). Conditional on there being a legally established budget, Dai Viet villages are more likely to fund the full budget locally (column (10)).

Next, in Table C-VI, we consider the additional outcomes: friendly security, psychological operations, and Land to Tiller. The effects for friendly security tend to be statistically insignificant. To the extent they are different from zero, they are consistent with the results

documented above, that is, Dai Viet households are more likely to own a radio (column (7)) and are less likely to have formal title to their land (column (8)).