Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Jul, 2017, Volume 85, Issue 4

The Evolution of Culture and Institutions: Evidence from the Kuba Kingdom

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA14139
p. 1065-1091

Sara Lowes, Nathan Nunn, James A. Robinson, Jonathan L. Weigel

We use variation in historical state centralization to examine the long‐term impact of institutions on cultural norms. The Kuba Kingdom, established in Central Africa in the early 17th century by King Shyaam, had more developed state institutions than the other independent villages and chieftaincies in the region. It had an unwritten constitution, separation of political powers, a judicial system with courts and juries, a police force, a military, taxation, and significant public goods provision. Comparing individuals from the Kuba Kingdom to those from just outside the Kingdom, we find that centralized formal institutions are associated with weaker norms of rule following and a greater propensity to cheat for material gain. This finding is consistent with recent models where endogenous investments to inculcate values in children decline when there is an increase in the effectiveness of formal institutions that enforce socially desirable behavior. Consistent with such a mechanism, we find that Kuba parents believe it is less important to teach children values related to rule‐following behaviors.


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Supplement to "The Evolution of Culture and Institutions: Evidence from the Kuba Kingdom"

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