

Description of data – “The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights”

subject:	unique identifier for each individual subject
situation:	unique identifier for each of the 10 different parameterizations of the delegation game, matching game1-game 10 as described in table 1.
sessionid:	Identifier for individual sessions.
finalprofit:	Final Profit in Swiss Francs.
showupfee:	showup fee in Swiss Francs.
type:	0: Agent; 1: Principal.
period_game:	variable indicating the period in which the specific delegation game was played.
aeffort:	Agent effort in the delegation game.
peffort:	Principal effort in the delegation game.
mae:	minimal agent effort requirement.
varianta:	Variant chosen by the agent. 1: Project \mathcal{P} ; 2: project \mathcal{A} .
variantp:	Variant chosen by the principal. 1: Project \mathcal{P} ; 2: project \mathcal{A} .
period_lottery:	period in which the control lottery associated with this delegation game was played during the lottery treatment.
period_lottery_del:	period in which the delegation lottery associated with this delegation game was played during the lottery treatment.
offeraccept:	certainty equivalent of the associated control lottery.
Offeracceptd:	certainty equivalent of the associated delegation lottery.
IV:	measure of the intrinsic value of the decision right.
revorder:	indicator for reversed order of the principal effort and minimal effort requirement elicitation.
va:	$P_{\mathcal{P}}$
vb:	$A_{\mathcal{A}}$
vc:	$P_{\mathcal{A}}$ and $A_{\mathcal{P}}$
vd:	P_0 and A_0
consistent:	Indicator for consistent answers in the loss aversion measurement.
lossaversion:	Indicator of degree of loss aversion.
In integers from -6: rejected every lottery to 0: accepted every lottery	
ioc:	measured willingness to pay to roll the dice in the control experiment to measure illusion of control.
eopt:	Optimal principal effort in the delegation game under selfish risk neutral preferences (see table 1 of the paper)
maeopt:	Optimal minimal agent effort requirement in the delegation game under selfish risk neutral preferences (see table 1 of the paper)
cost:	cost of effort associated with the principal’s effort choice.
EV_control:	expected value of the control lottery.
EV_deleg:	expected value of the delegation lottery.
EV_diff:	$EV_deleg - EV_control$
conflict:	measure of conflict of interest between the principal and the agent. 0.5: high conflict; 0.75: low conflict; 1: no conflict; see section 2.1.5 of the paper.
stakesize:	measure of stake size involved in the game. 1: low stake size; 2: high stake size; see section 2.1.5 of the paper.
peffort_control:	Effort of principal if she kept decision rights in the control treatment presented in section 5.5.1. Only elicited if principal chose to keep the decision right.

wtp_del_control:	willingness to pay for delegation in the control treatment presented in section 5.5.1. Only elicited if principal chose to delegate. If principal chose to keep the decision right, coded as -1.
delegation_control:	delegation decision in the control treatment presented in section 5.5.1.
variant_control:	Project choice of principal if she kept decision rights in the control treatment presented in section 5.5.1. Only elicited if principal chose to delegate.
period_control:	period in which the control delegation treatment associated with this delegation game was played during the control treatment.