The Econometric SocietyEdited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262
Econometrica: Jan, 1999, Volume 67, Issue 1
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00002
p. 21-43
Alvin E. Roth, Uriel G. Rothblum
We consider the strategic options facing workers in labor markets with centralized market clearing mechanisms such as those in the entry level labor markets of a number of professions. If workers do not have detailed information about the preferences of other workers and firms, the scope of potentially profitable strategic behavior is considerably reduced, although not entirely eliminated. Specifically, we demonstrate that stating preferences that reverse the true preference order of two acceptable firms is not beneficial in a low information environment, but submitting a truncation of the true preferences may be. This gives some insight into the successful operation of these market mechanisms.
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An analysis of two important issues: one providing a treatment of the friendship formation model when preferences are satiated in the number of friends and a study, in detail, of a model with discrete friendships.
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A technical appendix with extensions for the manuscript.
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There are results in the paper that were not fully discussed or proven fully. This supplementary material contains what was omitted or mentioned in the paper.
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This appendix has several sections. W1 is another example/application of the model. W2 is a brief proof of something asserted in the text. W3 provides a foundation for the model in terms of a game between the long run self and a sequence of shorter one selves. W4 explores an alternative model; it shows that the alternative makes no difference with linear control sets but leads to odd conclusions when the cost is convex.
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This appendix contains analytical and numerical results on various models. It also presents a method to numerically compute information bounds and check the non-surjectivity condition. Lastly, it outlines a specification test of parametric random-effects models.
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Appendix A contains the proof of Theorem 1 and discusses Remark 1. Appendix B provides proofs for the lower bound approach discussed in Section 4.1. Appendix C discusses the data, including details for the covariate specifications and the sample selection. Appendix D discusses the empirical specification for the lower bound estimator, presents the decomposition discussed in Section 6.3, and presents additional robustness checks referred to in Section 6.5. Section E provides details on the specification and estimation of the structural approach referred to throughout Section 7. Finally Section F presents a selection of pages from the LTC underwriting guidelines of Genworth Financial.
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This online appendix documents several detailed proofs from Sections 2 and 3 of the manuscript that were omitted due to space constraints. It also contains Appendix Tables 1-10 and Appendix Figures 1-2, which were mentioned in the main text of the paper.
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This web appendix presents additional details and analyses which complement the main paper. The reader will find details regarding the estimation procedure, including how standard errors were computed. The reader will also find goodness of fit analyses and simulations that complement those in the main paper. Finally, the web appendix describes how sectors were defined and provides a brief analysis of reallocation following Brazilian trade reform, which corroborates previously published results.
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This appendix is organized as follows. Section A illustrates another case of wealthy hand to mouth behavior which completes the discussion of Section 4.1 in the main text. Section B contains more details on our definitions of liquid and illiquid wealth from the SCF and on the measurement of hand-to-mouth households. Section C describes certain steps of the model's calibration omitted from the main text. Section D contains a robustness analysis on the baseline rebate experiment. The numerical computation of the model and the simulation of the policy experiments are delineated in Section E.
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