Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Mar, 1986, Volume 54, Issue 2

Multistage Games with Communication

https://doi.org/0012-9682(198603)54:2<323:MGWC>2.0.CO;2-P
p. 323-358

Roger B. Myerson

This paper considers multistage games with communication mechanisms that can be implemented by a central mediator. In a communication equilibrium, no player expects ex ante to gain by manipulating his reports or actions. A sequential communication equilibrium is a communication equilibrium with a conditional probability system under which no player could ever expect to gain by manipulation, even after zero-probability events. Codominated actions are defined. It is shown that a communication equilibrium is a sequential communication equilibrium if and only if it never uses codominated actions. Predominant communication equilibria are defined by iterative elimination of codominated actions and are shown to exist.


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