Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Oct, 1977, Volume 45, Issue 7

Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility

https://doi.org/0012-9682(197710)45:7<1631:TBPACU>2.0.CO;2-U
p. 1631-1637

Roger B. Myerson

Four conditions are shown to imply together that a solution function for two-person bargaining problems must equalize gains in some ordinal utility scales. These conditions are: weak Pareto optimality, strong individual rationality, composition, and uniformity. The composition condition relates to sequences of bargaining problems. The uniformity condition requires that the solution function must be invariant under enough ordinal utility transformationsto move any threat point to the origin.


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