New Papers Posted to Theoretical Economics’ Forthcoming Page

The following papers have been accepted and posted to Theoretical Economics’ forthcoming page and may be viewed here:


Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling

Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky, and Takuro Yamashita


On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators

Anna Bogomolnaia, Ron Holzman, and Hervé Moulin


The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning

Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, and Rann Smorodinsky


On the neutrality of socially responsible investing

Lutz G. Arnold


Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima

Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, and Siyang Xiong


Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade

Yi-Fan Chen, Wen-Tai Hsu, and Shin-Kun Peng


Which networks permit stable allocations? A theory of network-based comparisons

Chen Cheng and Yiqing Xing


Slow persuasion

Matteo Escudé and Ludvig Sinander


Robust comparative statics for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution

Joel P. Flynn, Lawrence D. W. Schmidt, and Alexis Akira Toda


Termination as an incentive devices

Borys Grochulski and Yuzhe Zhang


Stable matching: an integer programming approach

Chao Huang


Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: characterization and robust optimization

Abraham Neyman


Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers

Hitoshi Sadakane


Forall or exists?

Uzi Segal


Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: complete characterization

Siyang Xiong

Publication Date: 
Wednesday, April 6, 2022