New Papers Posted to Theoretical Economics’ Forthcoming Page

The following papers have been accepted and posted to Theoretical Economics’ forthcoming page and may be viewed here:

Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk
Lukasz Balbus, Pawel Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett, and Lukasz Wozny

Monologues, dialogues and common priors
Alfredo Di Tillio, Ehud Lehrer, and Dov Samet

Dynamically stable matching
Laura Doval

Censorship as optimal persuasion
Anton Kolotilin, Timofiy Mylovanov, and Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Games with switching costs and endogenous references
Begum Guney and Michael Richter

Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes
Sebastian Gryglewicz and Aaron Kolb

Two-stage majoritarian choice
Sean Horan and Yves Sprumont

A common-value auction with state-dependent participation
Stephan Lauermann and Asher Wolinsky

Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation and stochastic choice
Efe A. Ok and Gerelt Tserenjigmid

The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions
Jan Christoph Schlegel

Publication Date: 
Monday, July 12, 2021