New Papers Posted to Theoretical Economics’ Forthcoming Page

The following papers have been accepted and posted to Theoretical Economics’ forthcoming page and may be viewed here:

Monotone contracts
Daniel Bird and Alexander Frug

Quid pro quo: friendly information exchange between rivals
Andreas Blume and In-Uck Park

Prior-free dynamic allocation under limited liability
Sylvain Chassang and Samuel Kapon

Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly
Daniele Condorelli and Balázs Szentes

Value-based distance between information structures
Fabien Gensbittel, Marcin Pęski, and Jérôme Renault

Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
Daniel Gottlieb and Humberto Moreira

Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal-stopping problems
Kevin He

Persuasion with unknown beliefs
Svetlana Kosterina

Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets
Benjamin Lester, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and Julien Hugonnier

Experimentation in Organizations
Sofia Moroni

Equilibrium in a civilized jungle
Ariel Rubinstein and Kemal Yildiz

Informative tests in signaling environments
Ran Weksler and Boaz Zik

Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions
Wenzhang Zhang

Publication Date: 
Wednesday, September 29, 2021