New Papers Posted to Theoretical Economics’ Forthcoming Page

The following papers have been accepted and posted to Theoretical Economics’ forthcoming page and may be viewed here:


Collusion and delegation under information control
Andreas Asseyer


Private and public liquidity provision in over-the-counter markets
David M. Arseneau, David E. Rappoport W., and Alexandros P. Vardoulakis


On the falsifiability and learnability of decision theories
Pathikrit Basu and Federico Echenique


Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris


An explicit representation for disappointment aversion and other betweenness preferences
Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, David Dillenberger, and Pietro Ortoleva


The wisdom of the crowd in dynamic economies
Pietro Dindo and Filippo Massari


On the optimal design of biased contests
Qiang Fu and Zenan Wu


A Maximum Likelihood Approach to Combining Forecasts
Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin

Publication Date: 
Tuesday, April 28, 2020