New Papers Posted to Theoretical Economics’ Forthcoming Page

The following papers have been accepted and posted to Theoretical Economics’ forthcoming page and may be viewed here:

Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent
Daniel Barron, George Georgiadis, and Jeroen M. Swinkels

Bundlers' dilemmas in financial markets with sampling investors
Milo Bianchi and Philippe Jehiel

The no-upward-crossing condition, comparative statics, and the moral-hazard problem
Hector Chade and Jeroen M. Swinkels

Network structure and naive sequential learning
Krishna Dasaratha and Kevin He

Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
Dino Gerardi and Lucas Maestri

Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information
Wei He and Yeneng Sun

Delegating performance evaluation
Igor Letina, Shuo Liu, and Nick Netzer

Locally Bayesian learning in networks
Wei Li and Xu Tan

Mechanism design without quasilinearity
Tomoya Kazumura, Debasis Mishra, and Shigehiro Serizawa

Equilibrium coalitional behavior
Mert Kimya

Performance-maximizing large contests
Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel

Multiplier effect and comparative statics in global games of regime change
Michal Szkup


Publication Date: 
Monday, October 14, 2019