Econometrica: Mar 2012, Volume 80, Issue 2

Vote‐Buying and Reciprocity
p. 863-881

Frederico Finan, Laura Schechter

While vote‐buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote‐buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote‐buying with an experiment‐based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior.

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Supplemental Material

Supplement to "Vote-Buying and Reciprocity"

The final write-up contains an explanation written by Transparencia Paraguay as to how the political campaign works.  They discuss the role of the "operador pol?tico".

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