Econometrica: May 2011, Volume 79, Issue 3

An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA8852
p. 893-921

Jacob K. Goeree, Leeat Yariv

We study the effects of deliberation on collective decisions. In a series of experiments, we vary groups' preference distributions (between common and conflicting interests) and the institutions by which decisions are reached (simple majority, two‚Äźthirds majority, and unanimity). Without deliberation, different institutions generate significantly different outcomes, tracking the theoretical comparative statics. Deliberation, however, significantly diminishes institutional differences and uniformly improves efficiency. Furthermore, communication protocols exhibit an array of stable attributes: messages are public, consistently reveal private information, provide a good predictor for ultimate group choices, and follow particular (endogenous) sequencing.

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Supplement to "An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation"

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Supplement to "An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation"

A zip file containing the instructions given to experimental subjects.

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