Econometrica: Mar 2010, Volume 78, Issue 2

Strongly Consistent Self‐Confirming Equilibrium
p. 823-832

Yuichiro Kamada

Fudenberg and Levine (1993a) introduced the notion of self‐confirming equilibrium, which is generally less restrictive than Nash equilibrium. Fudenberg and Levine also defined a concept of consistency, and claimed in their Theorem 4 that with consistency and other conditions on beliefs, a self‐confirming equilibrium has a Nash equilibrium outcome. We provide a counterexample that disproves Theorem 4 and prove an alternative by replacing consistency with a more restrictive concept, which we call . In games with observed deviators, self‐confirming equilibria are strongly consistent self‐confirming equilibria. Hence, our alternative theorem ensures that despite the counterexample, the corollary of Theorem 4 is still valid.

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