Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Mar, 2002, Volume 70, Issue 2

Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two‐Person Games

https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00300
p. 693-715

Bernhard Von Stengel, Antoon Van Den Elzen, Dolf Talman

This paper presents an algorithm for computing an equilibrium of an extensive two‐person game with perfect recall. The method is computationally efficient by virtue of using the sequence form, whose size is proportional to the size of the game tree. The equilibrium is traced on a piecewise linear path in the sequence form strategy space from an arbitrary starting vector. If the starting vector represents a pair of completely mixed strategies, then the equilibrium is normal form perfect. Computational experiments compare the sequence form and the reduced normal form, and show that only the sequence form is tractable for larger games.


Log In To View Full Content

Journal News

View