Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262
Econometrica: Jan, 1999, Volume 67, Issue 1
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00003
p. 45-64
Abraham Neyman
It is shown that an exponentially small departure from the common knowledge assumption on the number of repetitions of the prisoners' dilemma already enables cooperation. More generally, with such a departure, any feasible individually rational outcome of any one‐shot game can be approximated by a subgame perfect equilibrium of a finitely repeated version of that game.
This file contains 4 Appendices. Appendix A lists the variables in the state space, while Appendices B-D contain details of the methods used to estimate and solve the model.
This zip file contains the data and programs for the empirical application. A brief guide to the content of the folder is given in the README.PDF file.
This supplement material contains the proof of he validity of bootstrap confidence bands for counterfactual functionals, a numerical comparison of quantile and distribution regression estimators, additional empirical results, and details about the variance decomposition of the composition effect.
This document covers numerically solved versions of the model and can be viewed as a robustness check on the main results.
In this appendix we formulate, solve, and estimate two additional mechanism design models: a model with unobserved capital and investment and a model with hidden output.
This supplement contains tables not found within the manuscript.
This zip file contains the replication files for the results reported in the online appendix.
This zip file contains the replication files for the results reported in the paper tables..
This supplement provides proofs for the paper.
Extensions of the proofs found in the paper.
This zip file contains data and programs for replication.
In this appendix we generalize the stochastic process for preference shocks.
PDF file containing supplemental appendix with additional analysis, tables and figures.
This appendix specializes the arguments for identification to the two by two game.
A zip file containing data and programs for the paper.
PDF file containing complete proofs of the lemmas and theorems presented in the paper.
An appendix containing proofs for the manuscript.
A zip file containing replication files for the paper.
This appendix provides formal proofs of Lemmas 2.7-2.9 in the text of the paper.
Technical appendices with details of the methodology and data, along with additional results.
Replication files for the manuscript, first stage. This archive addresses the dataset and the life-cycle profiles that are used in the structural model.
Replication files for the manuscript, second stage. This archive addresses the structural estimation procedure and the policy simulations.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
A zip file containing the manuscript's replication files.
This document contains two main sections which correspond to Appendix B and Appendix C in the main text. In the first section we formally derive the closed forms presented in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 in the main text. In the second section, we derive the expression for the bias in the variance induced by the use of a pseudo-panel (such as the one we consider in our estimations).
Zip file containing supplemental data and programs (approximately 40MB)
This technical appendix describes the numerical method used to solve the model in the paper.
A zip file containing the replication files for the manuscript.
A PDF file containing proofs and meta-analysis appendices for the manuscript.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This appendix provides a more detailed analysis of a parameterized version of the consumer model presented in Section 4.1. It also illustrates some of the theoretical properties of the model and shows that the model can incorporate features observed in the data. Third, it shows the calibrated parameters of the model to match several key moments in data and further explores the features of the model. Finally, it reports how well this model can be approximated by the linearized version in Section 4.3 of the paper.
This appendix describes the details associated with the estimation of the model described Sections 4 and 5 of the paper.
This zip file contains replication files for the manuscript
This supplement contains a full description of the estimators and their properties for the application in the paper.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This zip file contains Mathematica notebooks that calculate the integral formulas in the two-, three-, and N-tree cases.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
Description of the Iterative Algorithm, institutional background, results from the Long Term Refinancing Operations.
This PDF contains the instructions for the joint liability game with imperfect monitoring (complete experimental instructions are contained in the replication files) and Figure A1.
This file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This zip file contains MATLAB code used to estimate and solve the model. The file also contains data that can be used to estimate the parameters, although the share and revenue data has been permuted in accordance with my agreement with the company providing the data.
November 22, 2022
