Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Jan, 1979, Volume 47, Issue 1

A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations

https://doi.org/0012-9682(197901)47:1<49:APFGPE>2.0.CO;2-7
p. 49-60

Vincent P. Crawford

This paper describes a simple, operational procedure that, under reasonable economic assumptions, always generates Pareto-efficient egalitarian-equivalent allocations (PEEEA) when agents know each other's preferences. The procedure constitutes a new, constructive proof of Pazner and Schmeidler's theorems on the existence of PEEEA, and shows that PEEEA, like fair and Pareto-efficient allocations, can be decentralized using less information than is required by the standard market procedure for decentralizing allocations that maximize a neoclassical, individualistic social welfare function.


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