Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Jan, 1976, Volume 44, Issue 1

A Social Choice Interpretation of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Game<105:ASCIOT>2.0.CO;2-K
p. 105-114

Stefan D. Bloomfield

A certain set of weak rationality conditions is shown to be necessary and sufficient for a social decision function to be a cooperative game according to the formulation of von Neumann and Morgenstern. In exhibiting this broad connection between game theory and the theory of social choice, attention is focused on the critical role played by the blocking coalitions in such games.

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