This paper investigates the justification for the competitive assumption that consumers will act as price takers by considering the utility gain an individual can achieve by manipulating price formation through the use of non-competitive behavior. Although announcing one's competitive demand is generally not a best replay against the excess demand of the rest of the economy, we show that, as the number of consumers becomes large, the gain any one can achieve acting monopolistically goes to zero if the increase in numbers comes through replication or if the sequence of economies converges to an economy at which the equilibrium price correspondence is continuous.
MLA
Postlewaite, Andrew, and Donald John Roberts. “The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies.” Econometrica, vol. 44, .no 1, Econometric Society, 1976, pp. 115-127, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911385
Chicago
Postlewaite, Andrew, and Donald John Roberts. “The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies.” Econometrica, 44, .no 1, (Econometric Society: 1976), 115-127. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911385
APA
Postlewaite, A., & Roberts, D. J. (1976). The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies. Econometrica, 44(1), 115-127. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911385
The Executive Committee of the Econometric Society has approved an increase in the submission fees for papers in Econometrica. Starting January 1, 2025, the fee for new submissions to Econometrica will be US$125 for regular members and US$50 for student members.
By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device. Cookies are used to optimize your experience and anonymously analyze website performance and traffic.