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Supplemental material - September 2012 Volume 80 Issue 5
A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
René Kirkegaard
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Extensions
;
Extensions
- Supplement to "A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions"
René Kirkegaard
Description:
This appendix contains extensions as well as derivations of more refined bounds on the tying function.
View the file (pdf file format)
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