Data And Programs - Supplementary material for "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?": Data and Programs
Vincent P. Crawford and Nagore Iriberri
Description: This zip file provides the initial-response data from the four treatments analyzed in the paper, as well as instructions and Matlab files for replicating the econometric analysis. See ReplicabilityReadMe file for detailed description.
Extensions - Supplementary material for: "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?"
Vincent P. Crawford and Nagore Iriberri
Description: This Web Appendix provides background and more detail for the paper. It has five sections, the last of which, containing figures, is in a separate pdf file: A. Interaction between value adjustment and the bidding trade-off in first-price auctions. B. Calculation of First- and Second-Price Equilibrium, Cursed Equilibrium, and Level-k Bidding Strategies for Kagel and Levin's (1986), Avery and Kagel's (1997) and Goeree, Holt and Palfrey's (2002) Experimental Designs. C. Estimates for Level-k plus Equilibrium Models with versus without Truthful Types. D. Estimates of Subject-specific Precisions and Standard Errors (starts at A-29). E. Logit Bid Densities for Random L1, Random L2, Truthful L1, Truthful L2, and Equilibrium and Representative Precisions. (For section E see: "Supplementary material for "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?": Graphs").
Tables/figures - Supplementary material for "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?": Graphs
Vincent P. Crawford and Nagore Iriberri
Description: This file contains Section E of the Web Appendix, which graphs the logit bid densities for Random L1, Random L2, Truthful L1, Truthful L2, and Equilibrium and Representative Precisions, to illustrate the implications of the precision estimates reported in Tables IIIa-IIId and Section D of the Web Appendix.
