Contract Theory I
Sunday 25th August 2002,
14:30 - 16:00
Room: 1.8
Session Chair(s):
Giuliana Palumbo, Getulio Vargas Foundation and EUI, BRAZIL
Category: Economic Theory
OPTIMAL CONTRACTS IN A DYNAMIC COSTLY STATE VERIFICATION MODEL
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Presenter(s): |
Cyril Monnet, European Central Bank, GERMANY |
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Co-Author(s): |
Erwan Quintin, Federal Reserve Bank Dallas, UNITED STATES |
RISK AVERSE SUPERVISORS AND THE EFFICIENCY OF COLLUSION
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Presenter(s): |
Antoine Faure Grimaud, London School of Economics, UNITED KINGDOM |
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Co-Author(s): |
Jean-Jacques Laffont, University of Toulouse, FRANCE |
DECISION RULES AND INFORMATION PROVISION: MONITORING VS MANIPULATION
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Presenter(s): |
Giuliana Palumbo, Getulio Vargas Foundation and EUI, BRAZIL |
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Co-Author(s): |
Elisabetta Iossa, Brunel University, UNITED KINGDOM |
Total Papers in This session: 3
Session Ref: 604
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