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THE STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE OF RENT-SEEKING, INNOVATION, AND PATENT RACE GAMES
Category: Economic Theory
R&D and Innovations II
Tuesday 27th August 2002, 14:30 - 16:00, Room: 4.11
Session Chair(s):
Jaehyon Nahm, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, HONG KONG
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Abstract:
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Conditions are identified which guarantee the strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games. Our results permit one to apply theorems and results intended for rent-seeking games to other games, and vice versa. We conclude with several examples that highlight the practical utility of our results.
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